D+C Development and Cooperation (No. 1, January/February 2001,
p. 4-5)

Scientists believe that the Earth's climate will warm dramatically till the end of this century. The consequences could be severe flooding of coastal regions, an increase in storms and heavy rains in some regions, and more rapid desertification in others. But efforts to negotiate a binding agreement on limiting emissions of greenhouse gases have once again failed in the Dutch capital of The Hague.

The expectations were high: the climate summit of The Hague (COP 6) was to work out the detailed rules for the implementation of what had been agreed in principle at the climate conference in Kyoto in 1997, thus enabling industrialised and developing countries to ratify the agreement, known as the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol requires from industrialised countries, after decades of continuous growth, a reduction to 5 per cent below the 1990 levels of their combined emissions of greenhouse gases for the period 2008-2012. Until 2002 when a special summit will be held to review what has been achieved since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, more than 55 nations were to have ratified the Protocol (representing at least 55 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions of industrialised countries) to allow it to come into force. This was seen as the first milestone on the long road towards a more sustainable system of energy generation, transportation and industrial production.

The huge majority of nations - with the marked exception of the US - supported this time-table in their initial statements in The Hague. The last night of the conference was expected to bring the breakthrough. But this "night of the long knives" was followed by the "morning of the long faces": No results were achieved. "We could not reach agreement. I'm very, very disappointed" announced conference president Jan Pronk, the Dutch Environment and former Development Minister.

Better no deal
than a bad deal

Also disappointed were the representatives of leading environmental organisations, who gave an improvised press conference immediately after the collapse of the negotiations. They blamed the so-called Umbrella Group, among them above all the United States, but also Japan, Canada and Australia, for their attempt to fall back behind the greenhouse gas reduction targets to which they had agreed in Kyoto. On the other hand, NGOs praised the EU for not giving in and thus defending the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. "We're better off with no deal than a bad deal," said Bill Hare, the top climate campaigner for Greenpeace International. American NGOs saw this in a different light: "Instead of working to protect the planet, the Europeans stumbled badly when presented with what was a crucial opportunity," said Fred Krupp, the executive director of Environmental Defence, a private American group that focuses on building alliances between environmental concerns and private industry.

The different perspectives apparent in these statements not only highlight cultural differences between the US and Europe, which the French Environmental Minister Voyne saw as one reason for not achieving a result, they also reflect the different economic and emission developments in the US and Europe. They also show two conflicting thought models of how to make progress within the UN convention on global climate change. There are those, who believe in targets and integrity of the Protocol, namely the EU and many environmentalists. And there are those, who believe in processes, mainly the Anglo-American part of the world as well as most business groups.

Loopholes left in Kyoto

This conflict was already obvious three years ago in Kyoto. The Europeans pressed for strong targets, the US for an economically efficient process characterised by different kinds of emission trading. The outcome were relatively strict targets (but certainly not strict enough from an environmental point of view) and the promise of an emission trading system. But there was at least one fundamental problem connected with the Kyoto Protocol. In order to get an agreement on an overall 5 per cent reduction target for industrialised countries, several loopholes were included in the Protocol as a kind of compensation. The biggest loophole was the general inclusion of carbon dioxide sinks (forests and possibly land use patterns) with all their scientific uncertainty and lack of durability. Until Kyoto, the call for strict targets and an economically efficient process were complementary. An economically efficient process would make it cheaper to reach the targets and would facilitate the quick acceptance of stronger targets. Since the inclusion of loopholes in the process, we have a different scenario.

Preserve integrity
of Kyoto
climate targets

This was what German environment minister Jürgen Trittin meant, in a meeting with German NGO representatives, by arguing, that it might have been better to accept less ambitious targets in Kyoto and at the same time not agreeing to any loopholes. These loopholes, which allow emission reductions on paper without real additional climate protection activities, undermine not only the level of targets but also the integrity of the long term process. In the end, most in the EU didn't want to accept a deal which risked to undermine the climate targets of Kyoto. Jürgen Trittin explained: "Our bottom line was: The integrity of the Protocol must be saved. This means real reductions for industrialised countries - and we didn't get this." Dr. Stephen H. Schneider, a Stanford climatologist who has been active in the climate change debate for 20 years, expressed the opposite view. He accepted that the Kyoto Protocol may be only a beginning, and much stricter targets will have to follow: "But it is an important first step. You've got to get started." Start quick and dirty - this is how this approach could be summarised. For him, as well as for many US-negotiators and business groups, the EU call for integrity of the Protocol looked like an attempt to block the implementation of the tradable Kyoto-Mechanisms, overloading them with requirements and making them less attractive. For many EU-negotiators and environmentalists, on the other hand, the call for these mechanisms was translated into: "They want more loopholes".

Now, after the collapse of conference at The Hague, we have no process with of tradable mechanisms in place, and at the same time it becomes more and more unlikely that industrialised countries will still be able to reach their Kyoto targets. An alternative can only be not to look too rigidly on the first targets, but to assure the integrity of the process. Kyoto wouldn't have helped, anyway, if it remained the only step. This means, the important issue at the moment is not the targets - there can be compromises in this regard. However, it is not possible to compromise on the integrity of the basic mechanisms of the process. Otherwise these mechanisms will not be able to deliver whenever the political will for real climate protection will one day be created. Furthermore, the Europeans should support tradable mechanisms, but they should not compromise in regard to the integrity of these mechanisms. There must be a strong system for emission trading which can prevent a country from selling more "emission rights" than it is allowed. There must be a strict baseline, so that climate change projects in other countries don't get too many credits. An emission market is at risk if - by including forests and other temparture dependent carbon sinks - too much scientific uncertainty comes into the system. In an emission trading system, there can be no "money printing machine" which produces "emission rights" without additional, real and measurable reductions. If there should be compromises in these fields, then we need at a minimum to define a clear process defined to phase out these problems in the near future. We need a process which delivers with integrity.

Lack of good will
on the part of US

This global problem requests also from the US co-operative thinking and multilateral acting. The behaviour of the US in The Hague has shown, that there is a lack of good will. The US delegation was not even willing to discuss co-ordinated policies and measures to fight global warming. But in a globalised world we need a global framework to protect common goods like the climate. The actual attempts by President Bill Clinton to save the post-The Hague process are a positive step. But without the demonstration of real action to reduce emissions in industrialised nations themselves, it will be very difficult to get further support for the post-Kyoto-process from developing countries. There is a crucial counterdiction within the US-position. If they want a successful long term process, they should accept strong legally binding commitments to demonstrate progress until 2005.

There was a dramatic contrast between the first and the last day of the conference. At the beginning, Bob Watson, Chairman of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the most authoritative voice of science in regard to global warming, shocked the public when he presented the new scientific findings. Contrary to prior scenarios, the global average increase in temperature for this century is now expected to be 1-6 degrees and no longer 1-3,5 degrees Celsius. Over land it will be even more. It is expected that some regions will experience an increase of up to 10 degrees Celsius. (In comparison: the difference between the ice age and today's' warm age was about 5 degrees and developed over a much longer time period of time). Developing countries will be the main victims of this process. But at the end of the conference there was not enough political will to reach the first legally binding agreement for limiting this development.

The climate conference will go on in May. This could be the last chance to bring the Kyoto Protocol into life. Much is at stake. The strong positive signal that Kyoto sent to the business community might be replaced by its opposite. The UN might loose the trust of the civil society, that it can set the right framework for the huge global challenges of this century. A new North-South confrontation could easily emerge.

The developing countries, and especially the poor population there, would lose most if the process collapses. They don't have the money to protect themselves against weather extremes. They depend mostly on agriculture, and this sector will first be affected by climate change. At the beginning of the conference in The Hague, the developing countries appeared to be the main beneficiaries. New texts were basically agreed upon on how to support the adaptation of the least developed countries to climate change, how to increase capacity building and aid technology transfer. A new Global Environment Facility (GEF) alloting additional money as well as some structural changes of the GEF were accepted. The negotiating text presented by the COP- president Jan Pronk was quite in favour of the G77 and China.

These hopes were shattered on the last day of the conference which was a bleak day for our climate. But having seen the shocked faces of nearly all negotiators after the collapse, there is hope for a positive result in May. A lot will depend on the new US-president. But even if the US fails to ratify the Protocol, the rest of the world can go on, bring the Kyoto protocol into force and wait until the US will join in. On the other hand, if the United States block the UNFCCC-process through a veto in May, things could become more complicated. Such action would be a double attempt to take the rest of the world climate hostage. First, by being the biggest emitter - each US-citizen causes twice as many CO2-emissions as the average European - while others have to carry the consequences. And second, by not even letting other nations do what needs to be done. In this case, the world community must and will find a way to overcome this veto.