D+C Development and Cooperation (No. 3, May/June 2002, p. 19-21)

The defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and, hopefully, the end of civil strife in that country is turning the attention of the international community on rebuilding its war-torn structures. Post-war recovery has three dimensions: rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration. The socalled 'triple R' approach has also been tested in other countries such as Eritrea, as the author describes.

Since the end of the Cold War and, due to an increasing number of localized "hot" conflicts, international aid policy has undergone a significant change, narrowing both in breadth and focus. We witness a progressive "blurring of security and development concerns": stability is considered as a prerequisite for development, as development is seen as a means to prevent instability. It is quite logical that this is particularly relevant in post-war situations, where there is an urgent need to repair the damages of war and resume development, and at the same time prevent the risk of returning to armed conflict.

The debate on how this could best be done, and what role international assistance should play, is marked by two beliefs. According to the first the main problem is the so called gap between relief operations - reserved for emergency situations - and development activities which are to be resumed as soon as possible. The "gap" has to be bridged by manifold rehabilitation measures, in order to ensure a smooth passage from conflict management to post-conflict development. The second idea is that these measures have to be part of a coherent recovery programme following the "triple R" approach, meaning that post-war recovery has three dimensions: rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration which, from the start, have to be addressed together in an integrated way. Actually, both concepts are intimately linked.

Bridging the "gap"

From the 1960s until the end of the 1980s, the standard approach to relief and development was a separate one, with both aid categories seen as distinct and necessarily following each other. This is mainly due to the fact that during this period relief operations were mainly carried out in emergency situations caused by natural disasters, i.e. floods, earthquakes, droughts. The procedures and instruments of "Emergency Response Divisions" set up during this period everywhere in the world, but especially in Africa, were conceived to address this kind of disaster, in situations where overall public services were functioning more or less normally, and development could go on as soon as the emergency situation was mastered. The situation is not the same after the end of armed conflict when peace and security are slow to return, destruction and uprooting of populations more wide-spread and total, demining operations progress slowly and repatriation and demobilization procedures are often cumbersome. The concept of "continuum" is meant to address this kind of situation, bridging the gap between relief to development by reconstruction, in a planned way with appropriate timing for each phase. The approach is based on the idea that at each stage the appropriate specialised agencies would come in and as soon as their task is completed they would pass on responsibility to those fit for the next stage.

Actually there are some good examples of cooperation between relief and development agencies, like the CARERE-program in Cambodia, based on an agreement between UNHCR and UNDP. Based on these positive experiences the trend in the 1990s went toward replacing target group oriented programs by community or area oriented programs, where all people in a certain area are entitled to apply for rehabilitation support, whereas special benefits are reserved for certain categories, for example demobilisation money for soldiers, start-up packages for returning refugees.

But experiences have also shown that this linear concept of relief - reconstruction - development following each other is not realistic, in reality the three phases coexist, with changing emphasis not only in time, but also in space. In fact it is a "contiguum", not a "continuum". This applies to war and post-war situations as well as to emergency and post-emergency situations after natural disasters even if there are fundamental differences.

War and development

Even in times of peace there may be need of humanitarian assistance and support to reconstruction and rehabilitation, as is the case after droughts, floods and earthquakes, while development efforts go on as usual. Vice versa in war times development projects continue to be planned and implemented in those parts of the country which are not affected by armed conflict, at least if there are no sanctions. What is even more important, in times of war and other calamities, economic and social life of most of the people just goes on, adapting to changing circumstances. The majority of people continue to farm, trade and sell their labour in order to be able to fend for their living, usually only refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other directly war affected people are entitled to relief. But during war economic activities undergo changes, some traditional ones might disappear while new ones emerge or expand. These changes might deeply influence post-war development: peasant farmers have turned to growing poppy seeds or other crops used for drugs, women take on men's jobs because most men have gone to war, war lords will foster diamond and gold mining and trade. These changes will more or less dramatically affect post-war recovery efforts.

There are as many post-conflict situations as conflicts - each one is different. The situation after an overall civil war without a clear victory of one of the parties will be different from a situation where a liberation struggle has led to the defeat of the colonial power and the establishment of an independent state under the control of a national government. A completely different situation occurs if the end of the war is also the end of the state and state controlled institutions, leaving a void difficult to fill. In some cases the country is left without any government, in a "failed state" situation, as was the case in Somalia in the beginning of the 90s and more recently in Afghanistan. The form and intensity of outside interference will have to differ accordingly: for example after outside miltary intervention followed by an international PKO (Peace Keeping Operation) support to reconstruction and rehabilitation tends to be more prompt and intensive than in cases where the conflict has been solved without outside interference. The volume and timing of outside support measures also depend on strategic, economic and other political interests of those who provide them.

One difficulty consists in the fact that in practice it is very difficult to shift funds earmarked for one category to another, for example from "development" to "relief" or vice-versa, due to the fact that aid agencies usually are not only category - oriented but also have special mandates - like World Food Program (WFP) is in charge of distributing food aid - and employ specialised staff. Also funds are often earmarked for special target groups, like refugees or demobilised combatants. But there are also quite impressive examples for such shifts taking place. For example UNHCR which usually sticks very closely to its mandate carried out rehabilitation and even development activities in post-conflict Rwanda in the mid-90s.

The "triple R" approach

Despite these positive developments certain lessons obviously have not been learnt:

• Differentiated needs assessments - and of self-help capacities - before setting up a rehabilitation program are still the exception and not the rule;
• Impact assessments on the macro as well as on the micro level are extremely rare;
• Donor countries don't like to put their money into pools meant to fund overall programs, at best they engage in a trust fund;
• Agencies participating in rehabilitation programs still like to "pick and leave", choosing components for which they assume total responsibility, proceeding according to their own rules;
• In most cases appropriate procedures and instruments ruling the relationship between recipient governments and donor agencies - and among donor agencies - are missing, and only in rare exceptions do they function properly.
• In post-conflict situations even more frequently than in normal times, participation is handled in a top-to-bottom way: government services and aid agencies decide about the way in which the beneficiaries - or target groups - must participate in the implementation of measures which have been decided by others.

Post-war recovery comprises various and very different fields of action: reconstruction of physical infrastructure and repair of all kinds of material damage; rehabilitation of institutions and services; repatriation of returnees and relocation of internally displaced persons (IDPs); demobilization of combatants and reintegration of all war affected groups of population. The idea behind the triple R is that this tremendous task of reconstruction - rehabilitation - reintegration, covering all these different fields, can only be successful if it is addressed in an integrated way, as part of an overall post-war recovery program, planned and implemented in coordination and cooperation of all intervening partners. As much as the concept sounds reasonable, as difficult it is to put it into practice.

To work out such an overall post-war recovery program needs joint efforts of national and international actors. In theory everybody agrees that ownership of the program is with the national government. In practice intervening outside partners are usually in control of the whole process, from the start when conferences and workshops are organized to start planning and setting up of appropriate institutions. On the side of the national actors problems usually start with the difficulty or impossibility to get to work in a situation where national institutions might be as much damaged as the physical infrastructure of the country, where national expertise is reduced to a near to zero level by brain-drain and conscription. And usually all funds have been spent for arms supplies, no money is left for financial or material contributions to a recovery program, while the need for humanitarian assistance is as big as during the war, possibly in a situation which far from being peaceful and secure is aggravated by additional internal political tensions.

On the side of the international actors, that is agencies providing financial and technical support, one would expect fewer constraints, apart from tightly defined mandates (which - as we have seen - can be stretched) and availability of funds. Nevertheless, especially in post-conflict situations, where everybody is hoping for a rapid return to normality, aid agencies as much as other actors try to make their claims according to their mandate, resources and interests, with a view to gain a good position for future opportunities of cooperation. This results in separate, often quickly prepared, programs, conceived and implemented by different agencies, instead of an overall post-war recovery program meant to serve as a framework for all components.

The case of Eritrea offers a good example for this fragmented approach. As cooperation between intervening aid agencies was far from satisfactory after the end of the 30 years long and very destructive liberation struggle, one would have expected a better handling of the situation after the end of the so-called "border war" with Ethiopia. We find a sector oriented "Emergency Recovery Programme" (ERP) in charge of rehabilitation of infrastructure, private sector development and social protection, alongside a target-group oriented "Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme" (DRP), both to be funded, or co-funded, by the same international agency. Meanwhile another international agency has - with the help of bilateral funds - initiated a Programme for Emergency and Rehabilitation dealing mainly with reconstruction of shelter in war-affected areas. The same agency is trying hard to secure funds to support the reintegration of returnees, whose repatriation is funded by yet another international agency... Therefore the conclusion imposes itself that, "the picture, at present, is a somewhat fragmented one".

Post-conflict recovery
as conflict prevention

Many conferences and studies have dealt with the role of post-conflict recovery as an instrument of conflict prevention, producing nearly as many recipees how they could be most successful. The conclusions of an international conference organised by the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) of UNRISD can serve as an example:

• Post-conflict rebuilding is crucial because it is an important prerequisite for the prevention of future conflicts;
• Post-conflict rebuilding is essentially a development challenge which requires a special approach, with emphasis on mending relations and restoring trust;
• Local and national actors have the greatest responsibilities and capacity in post-conflict rebuilding;
• Post-conflict rebuilding is taking place in risky environments, all actors will have to be ready to take risks;
• Success of post-conflict rebuilding depends on the existence of an integrated strategy.

The forthcoming reconstruction program for Afghanistan could offer an excellent opportunity to realize the triple R approach in all its dimensions, as a Strategic Framework has already been developed for the country's post war recovery, following the UN-Secretary-General's reform plan. The purpose of this framework is to enhance the "synergy between the UN political strategy and international assistance ... and improve coordination among UN agencies, bilateral donors, Bretton Woods institutions, NGOs and local actors". Let us hope that all intervening parties will do their utmost possible to bridge the gap between theoretical concept and political practice.