D+C Development and Cooperation (No. 5, September/October 2001, p. 4-5)

Three African presidents - Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Abdelazis Bouteflika of Algeria - have worked out the Millenium African Renaissance Programme (MAP) which is an attempt to ensure that future development of the continent is designed by the Africans themselves. The initiative has led to lively debates in Africa and abroad. Positive assessments came from Germany as the following official reaction shows. In the meantime, the G8 summit meeting in Genoa, Italy, has also endorsed the Africa recovery plan.

In a series on the prospects for Africa, Britain's Economist magazine recently asked: "Who will mend Africa?" We all know that the answer to this question does not lie in Germany or any other European country, nor among the international finance institutions or major United Nations conferences. It can only be found within the African societies and countries themselves.

That is why we must find out what the Africans are talking about among themselves and what strategic ideas they have for the development of their continent. Currently, three proposals which could point the way for Germany's policy on Africa are on the table:

• Libya's idea of an African Union along European Union lines;
• The Millennium African Renaissance Programme (MAP) developed by South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria on behalf of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); and
• Senegal's Omega Plan for Africa.

The proposal to set up an African Union, which half the OAU members endorsed at the organisation's Summit last year by signing its act of foundation, is mentioned here merely for the sake of completeness. It is a declaration of political will which at this stage is hardly relevant for German development policy.1

The MAP idea calls for international solidarity, but emphasises that it is up to the Africans themselves to take their continent forward to a better future. Europe must, of course, help to support the framework conditions for sustainable development. But it is obvious - and commendably the Millennium Programme also says so very clearly - that the foundations for that must be laid in Africa itself. Consequently, the programme outlines a vision of an Africa which resolutely gets to grips with overcoming its problems. A continent which aims to set the right priorities and focal points for the future. One which does not want to be an international receiver of alms but develop into an attractive trade partner and location for investment. A region which as a recognised partner in the world community is able to make its contribution to solving global issues of the future.

African responsibility

The MAP analyses Africa's role in the globalised world, names the problem of economic decoupling, but also points out the strategic resources with which Africa can improve its position in the world economy. It also looks at Africa's share in responsibility for post-colonial mistakes and concludes that good governance must come from within, from the Africans themselves. Importantly, the MAP emphasises the need for peace and stability and links Africa's prospects for economic development with democracy and human rights. True, this is not new. But it is ground-breaking for African leaders to propose that undemocratic governments and despots be isolated by means of the OAU and joint programmes such as the MAP.

The European experience

The programme also gives a push to another debate which is also under way in the European Union as part of its integration and planned enlargement. How do you spell out identity, self-confidence, self-determination and self-responsibility in a world which is simultaneously growing together and falling apart in the era of globalisation? But it is precisely here, also against the background of our own European experience, that the question arises: is not the second step being taken before the first one? Is there really the professed African identity and cohesion so that the problems can also be tackled together?

Or does not the real disposition of African societies and ability of African countries suggest that the continent's main problems should at least for the time being be solved at national or even sub-national level? This assumption is at least the basis for the drawing up of strategies to reduce poverty in the poorest developing countries as part of the HIPC debt relief initiative.

A second question appears to be crucial for the success of the MAP: Is the main basic assumption correct that the programme rests on the African leaders' firm and shared conviction to "eradicate poverty and to place their countries on a path of sustainable growth and development"? With good reason, many Africans dispute that such a conviction exists. The MAP itself, for example, points out the problem of corruption. But a look at Transparency International's corruption index makes clear that in many countries most of the national income enriches only a few.

A second problem in Africa is the paucity of government action oriented on development. For instance, Zambia in the 1960s had the same per capita income as that of South Korea, which is now 24 times greater. That is certainly not due only to framework conditions in the world economy.

Flight of capital

Finally, there is the problem of the capital flight. The World Bank study 'Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?' found that in 1990 some 40 per cent of the private capital in sub-Saharan Africa was transferred abroad - compared with 10 per cent from Latin America and 6 per cent from East Asia. That indicates that the faith which Africans have in their own economic and finance systems is not very great. Preventing capital flight by putting in place the required framework conditions for attractive and socially useful in-country investment opportunities could mean a marked financial boost for many African countries. It is a fact that those who do not trust themselves have a hard time in wining the trust of others.

I mention here an aspect which is largely ignored, namely the creation of legal and administrative preconditions for formalising the informal sector. In Egypt alone, property assets owned by people in the informal sector account for about 70 per cent of the country's total real estate assets and are worth about US$ 240 billion. Good governance therefore must make efforts to formalise the economic and productive strength of the poor as, for example, Hernando de Soto advocates.

Another problem is the taking of responsible decisions. That is, decisions on war and peace, on democracy and human rights, on African 'common sense' which details the people's basic social and democratic rights. These decisions must be taken, or not, in Africa itself. German development cooperation can, for instance, advise and support an African country on land reform. But it cannot settle the basic issue of whether a land reform which is based on democratic principles and the rule of law is enacted at all.

Two sides of African reality

African reality presents a contradictory picture. On the one hand, we can note with satisfaction that there are now more democratically-elected governments in African countries than before. Military regimes and authoritarian rulers have been replaced by civil governments.

There are economic developments in, for example, Uganda, Mozambique and Botswana which raise hope for economic growth and greater investment. South Africa will deepen its political and economic relations with the EU after conclusion of a trade agreement between them. German companies also are stepping up investment in southern Africa in apparent expectation of positive economic and social development there.

But the reality also has its negative sides:

• There is now an acute civil war situation in about eight African countries.
• Six countries are involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, described as the first world war on African soil.So far not even the great African idol Nelson Mandela has been able to persuade warring parties, such as in Burundi, to cease fighting.
• Eritrea and Ethiopia will suffer for many years to come from the aftermath of a senseless war between them.
• South Africa has decided to launch the biggest armaments programme in its history, thus tying up resources which it could deploy to meet urgent needs elsewhere. The South African public is debating the government's move openly, widely and intensively.
• In many African countries the increasing spread of HIV/Aids is not only a serious health problem but also a crisis which is threatening social, economic and political development and can become a danger to peace and stability.

All these challenges touch upon the question of whether the MAP's core idea - combating and eradicating poverty - will be shared across the African continent. Like the programme's authors, I put my trust in a new generation of African politicians that are aware of their historical mission.

It is good that the MAP is based on a holistic approach to development. This is also reflected in its action plan covering the following sectors:

• Strengthening of mechanisms for preventing and coping with conflicts.
• Promoting democracy, human rights, participation and good governance.
• Strengthening education and public health services, particularly with regard to HIV/Aids.
• Ensuring macroeconomic stability.
• Introduction of transparent legal frameworks for finance markets.
• Development of agriculture, especially with regard to processing.
• Promotion of human resources and infrastructure.

There are good starting points for German development cooperation in all these sectors.

Demands on industrialised nations

The MAP's demands for support by the industrialised nations are:

• Acceptance of 'African leadership' in developing the continent.
• Accelerated debt forgiveness and further inputs to poverty reduction within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSP).
• Early achievement of the United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for official development assistance (although we all know how difficult that is at a time of tight budgets).
• Improvement of African countries' access to OECD markets.
• Promotion of private investments.
• Institution-building for state organisations.
• Greater engagement by the multilateral finance institutions, which must be oriented on African needs.

These demands read like a summary of the 'political homework' to be done in the OECD world. How difficult it is for us to accept even the idea of African 'leadership' or 'ownership' will be clear when a small African country self-confidently refuses to accept millions in development assistance because the conditions attached to it do not suit its own development strategy of self-reliance.

Omega Plan

Senegal's Omega Plan is also being discussed seriously by the development community - particularly in the USA. The plan's aim is for the African countries to catch up on the industrialised nations' lead in the sectors of material infrastructure, education, public health services and agriculture. This is to lead to the freeing of production capacity, greater investment and growth, integration in the world economy and greater numbers of African emigrants returning to their homelands.

The plan interprets the bottlenecks in the sectors mentioned above as primarily financial problems, which therefore are to be overcome by steered investment under international supervision.

Less suitable model

On the whole, the Omega Plan is a less suitable contribution to the ongoing discussion on development strategies for Africa as a whole. It trails by far the current level of the international debate (for many, the World Bank's 'Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?) and in particular does not match the standard of the MAP concept. The plan is geared one-sidedly to material preconditions for development and ignores the decisive upfront political issues such as ownership, human rights and participation. Consequently it emphasises the industrialised nations' responsibility for financing development measures much more than the self-responsibility of African countries and societies. Finally, the plan's approach is characterised entirely by a steering model based on central planning and administration which in Africa in particular has not worked.

Conclusion

After an initial reading, it appears that the Millennium Programme could develop into an benchmark for Germany's policy on Africa which should be taken seriously. But this depends very much on the response to this ambitious and optimistic programme in Africa itself.

The programme also must not be watered down during the discussions on it in Africa in the sense that self-responsibility for good governance gets diluted and countries see the solution for their problems mainly in external assistance. That would be a relapse into old ways of thinking and not serve the interests of self-confident development in Africa as a whole.

1) Since the writing of this text, the African Union was formally launched at the last OAU summit in Lusaka, Zambia. (see also report on p. 28 in this edition)