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Editorial
2/2004 |
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A universal aspiration of Enlightenment
In December, a UK Foreign Office strategy paper predicted there would be more religiously motivated wars in the future. It particularly expected tensions between “Western democracies and some Islamic countries and groups”. Obviously, Samuel Huntington’s familiar thesis concerning the Clash of Civilisations is not obsolete yet, even though competent critics have raised valid arguments against it. The fact that “some” countries and groups give reason for worries must not obscure the fact that we are not dealing with such an inevitable clash of cultures.
So far, there sadly is no model democracy in the Islamic world capable of drawing international admiration like Denmark or Canada. But it is also true that no predominantly Muslim country has reached the level of socio-economic development typical of rich industrial nations. Though some states have achieved considerable affluence thanks to oil they remain societies with feudal and authoritarian structures. The overwhelming majority of Muslims live in poverty – in conditions which did not prove conducive to democracy in the Christian world either. Christian churches, by the way, have their own problematic legacies. Not so very long ago, for instance, they got along well with right wing dictators in Latin America and Europe (including Germany) in spite of these tyrants’ penchant for violence and their abuse of human rights.
Afghanistan has a new constitution. It establishes an “Islamic Republic” and is an attempt to combine religion and democracy. Western support – including German support – will play a major role in helping create a better future for Afghanistan after years of war and despostism. However, the country is still marked by an opportunistic mercenary culture, which is likely to be a bigger obstacle to democracy and prosperity than religious convictions (interview with Jochen Hippler, p. 56).
Indeed, democracy in Afghanistan would make the country an exception in its part of the world. Afghanistan’s two big neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, also cause chronic worries. Nonetheless, their differences show that Islam is not a monolithic religion with a one-track political agenda. Quite to the contrary, the way Islam is interpreted and utilised in politics in Tehran has little in common with what is happening in Islamabad.
In Iran, fundamentalist mullahs have been in power for decades. A long time has passed since a delighted Iranian public celebrated the fall of the Shah. Now, the country’s new rulers are on the defensive. Why else might they wish to exclude liberal candidates from parliamentary elections? On an ideological level, the country’s sanctimonious leadership is wrestling with theologians who apply a more modern interpretation to the Koran than they do (Katajun Amirpur's article, p. 60).
In Pakistan, Islam has been the sole basis for defining the national identity since the day the state was founded. The general who rules the country today was once prone to rhetoric veiled in religion himself. He also used to show sympathies for militant Islamists in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Today he presents himself as an ally of the United States, has started peace talks with India and – as shown by the events in December – has become a target for terrorist violence himself (interview with Ayesha Jalal, p. 64).
In the Arabic-speaking world, too, Islam has more than one voice. In Morocco, for example, Islamists are shaking the foundations of the king’s power. Al-Qaeda-style terror, however, has undermined their influence and created an opening for the king to propose a carefully formulated reform of family law. While this reform does advance the cause of women’s rights it also serves to consolidate the monarch’s almost absolute power (Martina Sabra’s article, p. 68).
Muslim states are marked by deep internal divisions. Western governments must avoid being perceived as ‘the enemy’, against whom such divided societies may, for a short while, unite in solidarity. The big dilemma with democracy in these states does not stem from religion. The predominantly poor Islamic societies know many forms of authoritarian, undemocratic rule. Consequently, there is also a deep-seated desire for law and order – a desire even stronger, perhaps, than the one for representation and democratic deliberation. In many countries, Islamist groups exploit this desire for order. As a (possibly suppressed) opposition, their cause seems legitimate to many. However, this bonus is soon lost when Islamists rise to power – as they did in Iran and, for a while, in Afghanistan.
All summed up, there is no reason to view the universal vision of democracy and human rights as religiously constrained. This vision is a secular legacy of Western Enlightenment. It knows neither religious nor geographical bounds. The fact that major advanced nations suffer credibility problems is due to other reasons. They have simply supported authoritarian rulers too often and too long. Instead, future policy will have to support those political forces, which – whatever their religious beliefs – stand for more participation, responsible government and positive development. Short-term realpolitik may necessitate cooperation with rogues. But anyone who consistently backs the wrong people without expressing serious criticism creates dangers which really cannot be blamed on any alleged “clash of civilisations”.
Hans Dembowski
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