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The dilemma of having to decide fast

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02/2005 		 

The dilemma of having to decide fast

Peace-building does not work without the support of the population concerned.It is vital to involve local capacities and to expand them. Basic needs have to be taken care of fast – ranging from water supply to security and judicial reform. Speed is essential for winning the peace.


[ By Lakhdar Brahimi ]

In the past fifteen years, my activities in the world of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building have related mainly to Lebanon, South Africa, Haiti, Afghanistan, and most recently, Iraq. Each situation has been complex, each has been multi-faceted in the way problems arose, erupted and were – or were not – resolved. And each one of them has been different.

Each situation requires creative and quite different solutions. Thus, the guiding principle for me has always been to remember that it is the existing reality on the ground that must shape the response of the international community, our response. We cannot walk into situations with preconceived notions of what is required, what the reality is, and what we should do. This does not mean that one should go in empty-handed, without a plan. We simply cannot expect reality to fit our pre-arranged plans.

This is plain common sense. Yet, it is striking as to what extent this tenet is ignored in the practice of how we implement policies that claim to manage post-conflict situations. Think of it this way. When we talk of “post-conflict situations”, we are in fact talking of countries that have either seriously broken down, or have collapsed, or failed in some fundamental manner. We go there with generous ambitions: We want to bring about some form of sustainable economic development, we want to change the way people do things, we want to improve the way they run their courts, the way they police themselves, the way they uphold human rights, the way their women are treated, et cetera.

These are enormous undertakings, and by setting them as our aims we raise people’s expectations to dangerously high levels. As a result, more often than not, we set the stage for disappointment, resentment, perhaps even rejection and opposition. It is not the sincerity of our intentions that is in doubt here. Indeed our approach is often a reflection of idealism, enthusiasm and generosity, all of which is most commendable. But these fine sentiments should not obscure our judgement, and our plans need, at all times, be based on accurate information, lest we end up committing the dual sin of ignorance and arrogance.

Let’s not forget that by the time the international community arrives, some kind of conflict or catastrophe has taken place. In other words, a smell of failure is already in the air. Institutions have broken down, and people have failed to resolve their problems peacefully. None of this is uplifting stuff, and none that anyone in the country itself is too proud of.

In this context, there is the following question, which I consider vitally important and to which I know, as yet, there is no answer. When the United Nations or any other party is called into a post-conflict situation, especially when a big peacekeeping operation is being set up, the mission is started with little or no knowledge of the country, its people, and the parties to the conflict. And yet, extremely important decisions have to be taken from day one and at least some of these decisions will have far reaching and lasting consequences.

Here is the dilemma, then: on the one hand, you face difficult, dangerous situations and time is of the essence. Decisions have to be taken and the time to take them is right then. On the other hand, you are in very unfamiliar surroundings, you need time to listen to people and find out from them what they really want, what is acceptable and what is unacceptable to them. And you need to listen to many people because objective, impartial views are not readily available. How do you resolve this dilemma? I simply do not know. A lot of humility will certainly help – and a readiness, at all times, to adapt plans to these new realities one discovers and understands better as one goes along.


Legitimacy, ownership, security

These observations lead me to make my first point on how to proceed whilst considering reconstruction efforts. I believe that we now know only too well that intervention from outside a country – be it the United Nations, a regional organisation or a coalition of the willing – needs to be seen as legitimate and legal. This legitimacy should exist both internationally and more importantly, in the way people on the ground perceive that intervention.

The bottom line is that the overwhelming majority of the people of the country concerned – no matter how divided they may be on almost every other issue – must see that this intervention from outside their borders is meant to help them, all of them, and to help their country and all its people without any discrimination. This intervention should also benefit from wide international support.

My second point relates to local ownership. This has become something of a cliché of late. Under local ownership, I include bringing in local actors, with all of their knowledge of realities in their own country. They must be brought in, not only into the reconstruction operation but also in the development of the planning process. It is understandable to judge with some severity people who have messed up their country to the point where they now need – and accept – help from abroad to rebuild it. But it is important to resist the temptation of jumping from there to the conclusion that a nation which has failed in such a manner will necessarily lack talented people to write their constitution, repair their power plants or reform their justice system. It is even more important to resist the temptation of believing that since we are lending a helping hand, we are necessarily better qualified to do everything, indeed to take over.

Do we really need hundreds and hundreds of foreign experts and consultants descending on a country, and all that that entails in terms of boom-and-bust bubble economies? Should we not really be thinking of finding the right expertise within the country and amongst its diaspora communities? There are not many places where such local expertise does not exist. The question is more how to find it.

In societies going through a post-conflict phase, we have to concentrate on devising reconstruction programmes that use local knowledge, local expertise, including in how the programme is framed and the agenda set. They should be the implementers, they should be the owners. This will also ensure that the programme of reconstruction will be one that is specifically geared to the local situation, not some template taken from elsewhere.

Third, as we speak about the development of reconstruction programmes, we need to give serious thought to resources available for such purposes. I should add here that one of the advantages of having local ownership is that their expertise can provide a far more accurate picture of what kinds of resources will be required. Instead of the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars to be spent on expensive programmes, including on the salaries of foreign experts, maybe less can be spent on projects based on local standards. Programmes must be established in consultation with the recipient country so that actual needs are addressed instead of programmes geared to fit a donor’s pet project. In other words development, including in the humanitarian field, should be demand-driven, and not supply-driven.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that peace-building and reconstruction programmes do require adequate resources. And both on the political side and on the reconstruction side, international donors have to ensure that enough resources are made available. It would help immensely if funding was to be provided on a multi-year basis.

My fourth point is about security and the necessity to resolve the apparent disconnect between political and security policies on the one hand and reconstruction and assistance goals on the other. After a conflict – and even more so when the conflict is not completely over – the main aspiration of the people is for security: security of one’s home and family and property; security during travel to or from work, to another city or out of the country.

Reforming or forming the police force and the army, upgrading or reforming the judicial system are therefore always urgent priorities. Obviously, security, when it is reasonably well-established will greatly facilitate the implementation of humanitarian and development programmes. Reciprocally, these programmes will help stabilise the country and create favourable conditions for sustained security. All these activities should be seen as being an integral part of the political process.


Donor involvement

In this context, there is one important observation. Donors from the developed world have been very generous over the years. Germany and its European Union partners, Japan, the US, Canada, and the Gulf Cooperation Council members deserve our recognition and gratitude. Donor fatigue is understandable. As are the demands by donor governments and tax-payers in those countries, who want more transparency and accountability for the manner in which their money is spent. If anything, I for one, call for more active interest of donor countries not only in the programmes which they actually fund, but also in the parallel political process. Physical reconstruction and political reconstruction cannot be separated from one another. Economic progress cannot take place if the political process is stalled or is actually sliding back. Donors are perfectly justified to take an interest in the political process.

Such an interest would particularly be welcome in Palestine. There, we see the United States, the European Union and other donors giving generously to the Palestinian Authority as well as to UNRWA to build schools and clinics, help farmers, dig wells, provide services and even pay salaries to civil servants. Yet, because of the total lack of progress at the political level, because of continuing occupation and the resistance it provokes, we see the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli settlers destroying the very schools and hospitals built with internationally provided funds; we see more than a million trees uprooted, farmers prevented from harvesting their olives and other fruits, and crops actually destroyed by Israeli bulldozers and tanks.

Since the beginning of Oslo, $ 6 billion worth of international assistance was provided to the Palestinians between 1994 and 2004, making it one of the highest per capita foreign assistance in the world, excluding US financial support to Israel, of course. And yet, the living and economic conditions of the Palestinians, reflected in their per capita income, have declined to a level far below that which existed when the peace process began. The main reason for this has been the economic closures imposed by the Government of Israel, which have successively and successfully crippled the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza.

Much of the physical infrastructure provided for by the donors in the 1990s has been damaged or destroyed by Israeli military incursions over the last few years. In 2003, the World Bank estimated overall damage in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at approximately US$ 600 million. Thus, underlying this seeming paradox between one of the world’s highest aid levels and a dramatically dropping standard of living is the false separation between development efforts and the political process. Many inside and outside Palestine are asking: Why are the donors not demanding that the Israelis stop destroying all the infrastructure and the social services paid for by the funds they provide? And why does the international community condone in Palestine what it condemns everywhere else?


Reconciliation

My fifth point relates to national reconciliation efforts, an indispensable component of any viable peace-building programme. Experience tells us that most often than not, token reference to national reconciliation in hastily concocted agreements does not mean much. Only when negotiations have been patiently conducted, and agreements are responsibly achieved, would it be possible to see a credible follow up to the agreement on national reconciliation. This was the case in Mozambique and South Africa. Not in Sierra Leone at first. And not, it seems, in Côte d’Ivoire today. In Afghanistan, timid steps have been attempted in the past three years. It is hoped that more sustained efforts will be undertaken after the presidential elections.

In all cases, national reconciliation is a slow process. It is important to get it started as early as possible. And it should continue for as long as necessary. The tools are many: justice reform, human rights efforts, accountability and compensation, truth and reconciliation commissions, mediation and traditional forms of settling disputes, et cetera.

Beautiful plans drawn out in New York, or Berlin, or Washington – or, for that matter Tehran, Islamabad, Pretoria, New Delhi or Moscow will not work. In the course of the patient work being done to achieve national reconciliation, tensions will inevitably arise between the local parties themselves or between them and their international partners. Victims will understandably seek justice – that is, retribution to the perpetrators and compensation (in whatever form) for themselves, and they will want it “now”. But it may not be possible to satisfy these demands – legitimate as they may be – at least not now. Such tensions arose again and again in Afghanistan: was it right to allow individuals considered by many as warlords to attend the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002? Was it acceptable for these and similar individuals to continue to hold important executive positions in the government? Indeed, was it acceptable for people like General Dostum and Professor Muhaqqiq to run as presidential candidates?

These tensions are understandable: it is naturally the duty of human rights organisations and activists to vigorously campaign in favour of strict respect for human rights and to demand that all abusers, past and present, be held accountable for their deeds. But they surely understand that whoever happens to be administering the country when the conflict is barely ending will have to weigh these demands – legitimate as they are – against a host of other considerations.

The UN and the international community at large have been heavily involved in peacekeeping, peace-building and post conflict reconstruction. Donors have, all in all been generous. Yet we are constantly asking them for more. Our appeals will have a better chance of being heard if we consistently improve the ways in which we address these problems, if we really learn from our mistakes, if our lessons learnt exercises are to be more than an intellectual pastime.



Lakhdar Brahimi
is Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This essay is a slightly abridged version of the core section of his speech at a conference on post-conflict management organised by the German Foreign Office and Bertelsmann Stiftung in
October 2004. The entire text is posted on the web at:
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/medien/pdf/Berlin_speech_Oct_04.pdf.