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Contributions from
the Column
Focus
The dilemma of having to decide fast
Security understood correctly
Why speed matters
Dilemmas of fighting drugs
Complementing military efforts
02/2005
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Security understood correctly
Military intervention in a country is similar to administering a medical anaesthetic. It creates a limited time span for solving and addressing political problems. Self-supporting stability is the goal. The security provided by soldiers merely serves as a stepping-stone towards this end. If the political operation does not succeed during the brief period of military-imposed anaesthesia, the crisis is likely to re-escalate at a later point in time.
[ By Rudolf Adam ]
Prevention has become the buzzword of security policy. Precisely understood, the term has three aspects: Firstly, in the best-case scenario, early intervention below the violence threshold can prevent an outbreak of crisis. This is difficult to achieve, since it is hard to determine formal indicators for the outbreak of unbridled violence. Moreover, preventive action is always based on assumptions and spending a lot of money because of assumptions alone is always risky. Particularly in democracies, it can be difficult to make the public understand that a greater commitment of resources is required, as only few will perceive the full significance of the ill-boding indicators. On top of this, there is always the possibility that experts might make mistakes. How much are we prepared to spend on preventative security? This question is all the more relevant as high expenses may turn out to be unnecessary.
Secondly, prevention means stemming and isolating the impact of an open conflict once violence has broken out. It must not spill over to neighbouring regions.
And finally, after the volatile period of a crisis, prevention means creating sustainable security structures, which permanently prevent a new outbreak of violence. Well over 70 percent of the conflicts worldwide result from the rekindling of old, unresolved strife. Resolving disputes permanently, therefore, is a great preventive achievement. In this respect, the efforts made for the unification of Europe historically add up to conflict prevention. This idea may seem strange these days, but it is logically compelling if one considers European history up to 1945.
All crisis missions show that “peace making” (enforcing a ceasefire) is easier and more quickly achieved than “peace building” (establishing self-supporting security structures). The decision to send forces on a mission is made more easily than the decision to abort their peacekeeping effort. In any case, the political goal has to be well defined right from the outset. The means provided must be both adequate and appropriate. And yet, those in charge also have to make plans for the event that goals aimed for cannot be achieved within the designated cost framework. As the German saying goes, “if you go in, you’ll have to come out someway or another.” Someway or another – that is a crucial matter.
Challenges to peace building
In Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, we can see how drawn out and costly it is to establish “local ownership” by shifting responsibilities from foreign back into local hands. In order to maintain credibility and to avoid setting the wrong precedent, aborting apencekeeping mission is no acceptable option before the fundamental elements of a stable new order are in place. This is good reason to keep the goals of intervention moderate and low key (do not raise hopes for a miracle!). It is essential to conduct a realistic and honest risk analysis before the mission, to estimate the action force and resources required generously and to keep reserves up one's sleeve for the event of a worst-case scenario.
The argument for giving priority to security issues during reconstruction seems persuasive at first. What’s the point of investing in the infrastructure or production facilities if rebels are going to destroy the newly erected buildings again? How is one to invest if the protection of property and capital cannot be guaranteed? What’s the use of spending a great deal of money on job creation, given that employment is most likely to drop again in a very short time because of neglect – even if workplaces are not subsequently destroyed in the chaos of war?
Obviously, there is something to be said for the maxim, “security first!” However, it is also worth taking a closer look at the idea of security, which forms the basis of this maxim.
Security means reliable defence against danger. In terms of personal safety, this is about minimising risks and making them calculable. In times of civil war, anyone who steps out the front door has to reckon with being shot. Safeguarding one’s life and the lives of relatives as well as protecting personal property become the responsibility of the individual and take up a large proportion of a person’s productive energy. Gainful economic activity is not possible under such circumstances.
In normal times, security is a governmental issue. It is a classic collective good. Providing security is the core task of statehood, however else that may be defined. The key characteristic is the state monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force. Wherever that is called into question, the first stage of state failure has already taken place.
It is easy to bring in external armed forces and to temporarily order them to provide security in conflict and crisis situations. But will they succeed? That will probably only be the case if they are accepted and respected as bringers of peace and stability. It would be presumptuous to believe that a handful of armed external security forces could provide security unless the majority of the population accept them in this function. The problems of the coalition troops in Iraq highlight the difficulties security forces have to contend with if they come up against wide and deep-rooted resistance.
If the traditional, local security structures have been eroded, new ones must be put in place. Whoever tries to do so must take care that the new structures fit in with traditional patterns.
New perspectives can provide legitimacy
The legitimacy of new structures will depend on whether they can provide social strata impoverished by civil war and tyranny with new prospects. The new structures must be sufficiently funded. Initially, it will not be possible to generate the necessary money in the country itself. Moreover, it is important that people made redundant from the old, compromised structures are given adequate material compensation. Persons who are skilled in the use of arms for making their living will not be prepared to give up profitable existences as warriors for the certainty of downward mobility. That is why former armed forces are prone to becoming heavily armed, looting gangs. The transition from rebel soldier to common criminal with political pretences is small and fluid.
Security will only take new, permanent roots if it is based on a new social consensus. Creating this consensus is a political task, not a military one.
Whether the local population accepts the crisis mission and its military protection is crucial for success or failure. In order to win acceptance, it is necessary to be in touch with the local interest groups and local traditions as well as to involve them transparently in all security planning. The operations of the foreign troops must be explained in detail and communicated to the local population. Human rights must be strictly adhered to. After all, the credibility of a foreign, temporarily occupying power’s rhetoric will always depend on how its soldiers behave – and a section of the affected population will always perceive the presence of foreign troops as an occupation. It is precisely for this reason that the cases of blatant human rights abuse at Abu Ghraib were so serious. They deeply shook the credibility of the coalition troops.
The policy approach has to be regional. This is particularly true in areas where ethnic groups and cultures overlap with political borders. Hardly any conflict in Africa can be resolved exclusively within the existing state borders, and, consequently, security concerns transcend them. In these cases, operational systems of social, economic or cultural cooperation matter more than formal borders, which were frequently defined by arbitrary colonial power or historical coincidence.
Constitutional consensus as a goal
New security structures need the foundation of a new legal consensus as soon as possible. Whether that can be managed will normally prove decisive. The use of force will only be considered legitimate if it is based on a system of values in line with such a consensus. Making matters more difficult, that system of values may often look different from one typical of modern mass and media democracies. One will not be able to push aside, overnight, local structures such as clientele relationships or traditionally sanctioned positions of authority such as village elders or tribal chiefs. It is important to support a constitutional consensus and to emphasise the limits for majority decision-making (even a majority may not take away from the minority their status as citizens with equal rights). The use of force may only be permitted for issues of national security rather than for partisan purposes and this must be guaranteed through appropriate regulations for transparent monitoring. Generally speaking, it is important to realise that the new political authorities are less likely to be contested, the more credible their claim to represent society as a whole and of being committed to the common good turns out to be.
Taking over responsibility for security in a foreign country is like administering an anaesthetic. The measure allows, during an exceptional period, operations to be performed on the “body politic” of a collapsed state. The immediate aim will always be to quickly restore local vitality in accordance with the prevailing political traditions. Self-supporting stability is the goal and security is merely a stepping-stone towards it. Like any anaesthetic, this phase can only be maintained for a limited period of time. If, during this period of military anaesthesia, the political operation is not completed successfully, there is danger of relapsing into crisis and aggravating the consequences.
It will only ever by possible to accept responsibility for security in a foreign country in the form of a trusteeship. The roots for new stability have to grow from the country itself. In this respect, the maintenance of external security by a military or police presence can only be temporary. It has a deterrent effect and, therefore, will eventually be seen as threatening. However, the goal, from the outset, must be to stabilise a difficult security situation as quickly as possible, so that external intervention and its forceful threats are no longer required. All summed up, neither security nor stability but peace is the final goal.
Precisely in crisis missions, it is of utmost importance to understand security in a holistic sense rather than too narrowly from the very beginning. The desired final outcome should always be kept in mind. The corset of external intervention must not become a permanent support but should, as fast as possible, restore autonomous stability as well as locally sustainable and resilient structures.
Security remains central to any post-conflict scenario. But security should be understood in a comprehensive way. It cannot be pursued exclusively or even at the expense of other aspects.
Dr. Rudolf Adam
is the president of the Federal College for Security Studies
in Berlin.
adam@baks.bund.de
http://www.baks.org
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