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Contributions from
the Column
Tribune
Tajikistan needs policy change
Untapped potential
New approaches for Bolivia and Nicaragua
02/2005
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[ Bad governance ]
Tajikistan needs policy change
The Central Asian country of Tajikistan resembles many African countries, as far as poverty and the quality of governance is concerned. Donors should put co-ordinated pressure on the government, since many of the local problems are self-inflicted. In neighbouring Kyrgyztan, a successful land reform has helped to prevent the kind of mass deprivation experienced in Tajikistan.
[ By Frank Bliss ]
In Soviet times, the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were considered to be economically backward. Nevertheless, they experienced an enormous economic and social upturn after World War II thanks to government aid. Tajikistan, the poorest Soviet Republic, had electricity in even the remotest villages and more or less enjoyed full employment up to 1991. These facts made it seem like a paradise, particularly when compared to neighbours such as Afghanistan, Pakistan or the Chinese province of Sinkiang.
School enrolment levels were above 99 percent, with girls making up 50 percent of all pupils. In the 1980s, nearly one household in three owned a car. Given secure income even for retired people, hardly anyone complained about the lack of civil liberties or the inflexible economic system.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was particularly tough for the Central Asian countries. They had been heavily subsidised, remote-controlled members of a centrally planned economy. Almost overnight, they lost important export markets, while their supply of primary products broke off. Previously, between 30 and 70 percent of Tajikistan’s gross national product (depending on the source) was in the form of subsidies. Almost the entire economy came to a standstill, salaries and wages were no longer paid, and energy provision collapsed. Then a civil war (from 1992 to 1997) claimed more than 100,000 lives and set an end to many branches of the economy.
Throughout Central Asia, the payment of state wages was all but terminated, and pensions were slashed to little more than token amounts. Even members of the established educated elite and some of the former communist wielders of power (“nomenklatura”) were economically uprooted after 1991.
Today, the living conditions of large sections of Tajikistan’s population are little better than in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2000, 2004, Bliss, 2005). Tajikistan’s gross domestic product was nominally only 185 dollars per person in 2003. That is the same as Benin, or rank 161 in the global community. Nevertheless, last year the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI) placed Tajikistan in 116th place out of 177 countries. The educational situation, which is still relatively good, was the decisive factor. The adult literacy rate is 99.5 percent and the education index of 0.90 is almost the same as that of Luxembourg (0.91).
The World Bank assesses Tajikistan’s GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, arriving at the annual figure of 980 dollars per capita. But this is over-stated and does not take into account high import prices (for instance, for staple foods like wheat and for energy). Furthermore, the majority of the population is far from reaching the nominal average. At least two in three households in Tajikistan must content themselves with a daily amount of approximately 0.20 cents per person. With the ppp factor of five, which the World Bank uses, this would be the equivalent of one dollar per day. Most households, therefore, fall into the category of the absolute poor.
Wage data clearly show poverty’s full extent. The state pays primary school teachers the equivalent of 8 dollars per month and high school teachers a little more than 10 dollars per month. The official wage scale for 2004 showed a monthly salary of 2.85 dollars for doctors and 2.30 dollars for nurses. The situation is even worse for hundreds of thousands of workers on the former Soviet farms, which for the most part are still run as state-owned enterprises. Entire families are paid less than three dollars per month.
Their survival is ensured by the subsistence economy. Almost all households in rural areas farm tiny pieces of land, cultivating enough vegetables and potatoes to last several months. There would, in fact, be enough land for all families to support themselves but, for the most part, it is still under the control of the state and the former Soviet farms (“sovkhoz”), which resist the privatisation international donors are demanding.
The catastrophic economic situation causes a growing number of young men to emigrate. It is estimated that up to 800,000 people are currently living abroad, but only half of them may be expected to be sending home money. They can usually transfer no more than a few hundred dollars per year to their families, because many migrants are themselves living in precarious situations, or even illegally (in Russia, for example).
The living conditions in rural areas are particularly bad. Many Tajik families can only heat their homes in the coldest winter months. Many children are sent to school barefoot and about one quarter of children are not even able to leave their houses in winter because they do not have warm clothes. It is quite common for families to go without at least one meal a day.
The neighbouring country of Kyrgyzstan shows that things could be different. In this former Soviet republic, a successful land reform was carried out and, by 2000, two thirds of the former state land had been distributed to the population. Teachers and hospital staff also benefited from this policy. It is true that, generally speaking, 0.5 to 1.5 hectares per household do not serve as a basis for a sustainable farming sector. To a large extent, however, it does allow families sustainable self-sufficiency with enough left over to trade or sell. Admittedly Kyrgyzstan’s HDI is only slightly better (rank 110), but its GDP is 65 percent higher and far more fairly distributed than in Tajikistan, where private households have gardens of only 0.08 to 0.15 hectare in size. The gap is widening after both countries started out from equally modest positions.
Nonetheless, Tajikistan does have some positive features too:
– There is enough arable land to support the entire population, if its use were directed towards development.
– Foreign currency is obtained and taxes are collected, thanks to aluminium production and the export of cotton.
– The general level of education remains fairly high despite a drop in standards.
Unfortunately none of these location factors is exploited systematically. Therefore, the national budget and the population hardly benefit from the proceeds in the two key sectors. On the contrary, the system is geared towards the benefit of vested interests to such an extent that cotton farmers put more into production than they earn. The requirements imposed by district authorities, by wholesale monopolies and by government land management make sure of that. The extreme poverty of many families thus results from extremely bad governance.
Vested interests prevent economic development getting started in other areas than agriculture. Anyone who sets up a business immediately becomes the victim of money- and bribe-hungry bureaucrats. Many small business operators, who have successfully created jobs, are forced to give up because countless underpaid civil servants put the squeeze on them. Police controls obstruct transportation with the sole purpose of obtaining bribes. The fact that the national economy, nevertheless, recently notched up growth rates of up to 10 percent per annum is solely due to the particularly favourable aluminium and cotton prices. The drug trade from Afghanistan via Tajikistan to Russia and other countries is also economically significant.
A look at the international development aid delivered to Tajikistan makes it clear that there is currently no shortage of money. Funds are provided by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union and by bilateral donors such as the US and Japan and, to a much lesser extent, Switzerland, Sweden and Germany. Absorption problems are already apparent – one example is linked to the fact that Uzbekistan is boycotting cross-border electricity schemes. Despite the considerable financial investment, poverty research consistently shows that large sections of the population think their situation is deteriorating. The data prove that they really are not doing well on objective basis either (World Bank 2000, 2004).
A key problem for Tajikistan’s development is that the land reform is being delayed even though donors have often been promised its enforcement. So far, the reform has only been carried out where very small areas are available, such as in mountain regions, which are of no interest for the powers that be. All of the land in irrigated areas is de facto still under state control.
There are glaring deception attempts. Plots of land are supposedly “privatised”, but the new owners are obliged to use 90 percent for unprofitable cotton production. Many of these “self-employed farmers” quickly relinquish their “independence”. Individual state-owned farms are also divided into “smaller private farms”, with some “managers” controlling several hundred hectares of land, which they are supposed to pass on to farmers in smaller units. In practice, the farmers do not receive title and the land is transferred on the quiet in accordance with the vested interests.
Despite the profits which cotton brings to a minority of the Tajik population, the agricultural infrastructure is in a critical, rapidly deteriorating situation. Large areas are already suffering from salt accumulation. There is a huge need for investment, which can only be funded by development aid. However, anyone supporting the state farming sector will indirectly help to stabilise the system. This dilemma for development programmes has not yet been discussed publicly.
The donors are not co-ordinated well and therefore do not put any pressure on the government of Tajikistan. This affects virtually all areas of development cooperation. In part, the poor co-ordination is due to a lack of interest because Tajikistan seems to have little relevance for some donors. However, specific interests link other countries with Tajikistan. For example, the US sees Tajikistan (a muslim neighbour of Afghanistan) as a partner in the “war on terror”. Development cooperation thus emphasises contact with the government, rather than what the population urgently needs and what would improve the conditions for socially fair development.
Despite its hitherto relatively modest role in the area – or perhaps because of it – the German Development Ministry should devote more attention to Tajikistan and the entire region. It could make Tajikistan’s particular poverty issues a subject for discussion within the donor community and make clear the need for a political dialogue with its government. In addition, greater commitment to key development areas that directly benefit the population (such as supporting women or small-scale businesses) would make sense. The Ministry should strive assertively for the role of “lead donor” and not shy away from discussing Tajikistan’s self-inflicted development problems in public.
References:
Bliss, Frank (2005):
Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs. London (in print).
UNDP (2003):
Tapping the Potential. Improving Water Management in Tajikistan. National Human Development Report 2003. Dushanbe.
UNDP (2004):
Human Development Report 2004, New York.
World Bank (2000):
Republic of Tajikistan Poverty Assessment. Washington.
World Bank (2004):
Tajikistan Poverty Assessment Update. Main Report. Dushanbe.
Prof. Dr. Frank Bliss
teaches social anthropology (development anthropology) at the University of Hamburg and is a partner in the development consultancy Bliss & Gaesing. His most recent research in Tajikistan was in September 2004.
bliss.gaesing@t-online.de
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