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Contributions from
the Column
Studies and reports
Assessing the costs, benefits and risks
of GM crops on a case by case basis
DAC discusses civil-military cooperation
Ownership is the goal rather than the means
Making use of local expertise
US Senate approves outsourcing ban
Organic cotton is gaining ground
3/2004 |
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[ UN missions ]
Ownership is the goal rather than the means
According to the United Nations, elections will not be feasible in Iraq before July. Nonetheless, the world organisation is in favour of handing power over to an Iraqi government by that time. The UN has often made such decisions. In Cambodia in the early 1990s, in East Timor (1999 – 2002) and in Kosovo (since 1999), for example, UN peacekeepers even assumed sovereign powers on a temporary basis. And some of those operations might have worked out better if the prospect of a governing role had not been held out to the local population so quickly. This is the conclusion of a study published by the New York policy research institute International Peace Academy (IPA). IPA’s findings do not mean, however, that local populations can be ignored. On the contrary, where no account is taken of local traditions and no attempt is made to build on existing political structures, transitional administration by an external occupying force is doomed to failure. It is misleading to claim, however, that transitional administration depends on the consent or “ownership” of the local population. “It is inaccurate because if genuine local control were possible, then a transitional administration would not be necessary. It is counter-productive because insincere claims of local ownership lead to frustration and suspicion on the part of local actors.” Ownership, the IPA study asserts, is the objective of transitional administration, not the means.
Just as important as clarifying the relationship between transitional administration and local population are clear definitions of UN mission goals and commensurate mandates. According to the IPA paper, the reason the UN operation in East Timor was so successful was that it had a clear, uncontroversial objective: independence from Indonesia. In contrast, the operation in Kosovo has limped on for years, making little progress because it is not clear what it is supposed to achieve: Kosovo’s independence from Serbia or just some form of autonomy for the region? The consequences of a vague political mission can also be seen in Bosnia, where a labyrinthine tangle of regulations designed to direct the operation actually had the effect of tying it in knots.
The international community’s support for UN operations also needs to be clearer. Money which has been committed is frequently paid late or not at all, IPA observes. What is needed are international monitoring mechanisms to help check whether pledged capital actually flows. Readiness to commit troops in crisis regions is equally important. Generally speaking, IPA favours “robust” military mandates which allow the use of force for more than just self-defence. “The dichotomy between peacekeeping and enforcement actions was always artificial, but in the context of internal armed conflict where large numbers of civilians are at risk it becomes untenable.”
IPA views with concern some of the recent approaches to crisis management in connection with the war on terror. It welcomes the fact that awareness of the problems resulting from weak or failed states has increased since September 11, 2001. At the same time, however, it sees a risk of the standards of post-conflict reconstruction in such states being lowered. “The level of physical and economic security required in Afghanistan to prevent it becoming a terrorist haven, for example, is not the same as that required for the basic peace and prosperity of the general population.” (ell)
For the study itself and further information, see www.ipacademy.org
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