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Shared responsibility – or
rhetoric

“Faces turn to stone”

Holding the provate
sector accountable


04/2006
  

[ Good governance ]

Shared responsibility – or rhetoric

African governments have agreed to cooperate more closely on issues of development, security and peace. The principle of non-intervention has been abandoned. It is time to enhance common institutions in order to make them more effective. The African Peer Review Mechanism will only be credible and legitimate, if the results are made available in public.


[ By Henning Melber ]

Since the turn of the century, concerted efforts of African governments have led to visible institutional changes. Until recently, the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention into the affairs of other states were the official norms of the Organisation of African Union (OAU). In contrast, the Constitutive Act of its successor, the African Union (AU), proclaimed a paradigmatic shift towards collective responsibility in matters of human and state security. In grave circumstances, heads of governments are now empowered to agree collectively on interventions in member countries. This principle has been enforced in practical terms and borne fruit in several cases. African leaders have assumed mediating roles to control, reduce or even end conflicts. The concerted negotiated exit option for Charles Taylor, as well as the interventions in Togo and Darfur are among the recent cases in point, though not necessarily complete success stories.

This new political determination is also evident in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) with its hitherto unprecedented emphasis on locally-designed approaches to democracy, human rights and good governance. These dimensions are considered essential for socio-economic development. Just because NEPAD was adopted as the economic programme of the AU, one should not lose sight of the fact that it was meant to be (and should become) much more than only that.

External partners – notably the G 7/8 and the EU – welcomed the NEPAD perspective early on, hoping to support African efforts of fostering development as well as enhancing peace and security. NEPAD’s architects enjoyed a bonus of confidence and trust because of the thrust of the blue print they were selling. Interestingly, they did so first abroad before promoting the cause at home. Once embraced and approved by the AU, NEPAD was endorsed as Africa’s official development strategy by the United Nations.

Ever since its consolidation, however, NEPAD’s rhetoric is being compared with real achievements and the lack thereof. Anyone who wants to support NEPAD without keeping both eyes shut in romantic Afro-optimism, must admit that the road is indeed long and winding. Not all results have been convincing – and in some cases, there aren’t any. The failed litmus test of Zimbabwe, where African neighbours still shy away from intervening in disastrous domestic affairs, is just one prominent example.


Peer pressure and accommodation

An interesting new dimension of NEPAD is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The idea of African governments assessing one another’s performance signalled a turning point in the search for common ground in continental cooperation. Although it is a voluntarily entered process, the APRM offers an important opportunity to enhance a country’s international reputation and to attract external support.

The peer review process was widely welcomed and accompanied by rather high expectations. As a practical instrument, however, the APRM has its limits. Many governments affected have kept close control of the mandate and applicability of the APRM. They tend to rather narrowly restrict the dimensions of what is actually to be assessed.

It took several stages to define the rules of the APRM. Negotiations were delicate, and many compromises were necessary. African governments worried that the APRM might impose unwanted examinations and even lead to undesired interference in their domestic activities. Therefore, ownership of the process was transferred from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) to the AU. It is telling that the APRM, though operational, is still not spelled out in a legally binding document such as a protocol.

As a result, decision-making remains vested in the countries under review. This circumstance, of course, casts doubt on the true autonomy and independence of the review agents. Results are only made publicly available if the government examined agrees to doing so. Accordingly, the very authorities that claim to prove their accountability to others largely stay in charge of the APRM process. The legitimacy of such a limited and constrained fact-finding exercise will remain dubious, particularly as opinions may differ among the parties involved.

So far, African countries have shown more interest in the process itself than in publicly discussing its results. By early 2006, almost 30 countries had registered for the APRM. Among those that have not done so yet, unsurprisingly, are many of the problem cases. The first country missions (Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda) were started in 2004. Six more missions (Algeria, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) have been undertaken since. However, little is known in terms of visible results, to which the countries concerned would have to measure up.

The APRM is supposed to be a tool for enhancing collective responsibility within the community of African countries. It obviously has the potential of becoming a core indicator of governmental performance in Africa. For that to happen, however, the APRM will need the highest possible degree of international credibility. This in turn will require clear guidelines securing transparency and accountability. The domestic and international public have to be informed. Actively involving non-state actors in the process would greatly enhance credibility and, accordingly, legitimacy. Churches, trade unions, universities, the private sector, independent media et cetera should take part in the process. The core challenge, however, is to clarify how the AU and its members are to treat governments that do not comply with fundamental principles of good governance. After all, the APRM is a voluntary exercise, which is, so far, controlled mainly by those under review. Diverging assessments of governance matters remain undisclosed, because results are only published with the consent of the government scrutinised. Those unwilling to undergo the APRM, even avoid the process of negotiating an acceptable formula with those supposedly making an independent assessment.

Pertinent questions result from the current state of affairs:
- What is the real progress (compared with mere rhetoric) in terms of collective responsibility and common action?
- To what extent does the APRM constitute more than a club of mutually adoring actors capable of reading the signs of the times without really complying with the principles of good governance?
- How can the APRM help to distinguish pseudo-legality (misleadingly giving the impression of governance sanctioned by law, even when, in truth, unethical and immoral) from serious efforts to improve governance?
- What role should donor countries play in this African initiative?

Such questions need to be answered. It would be na•ve to prematurely praise current developments. Doing so would probably be just as destructive as gloomy claiming that we are merely witnessing the selling of old wine in new bottles. As so often in transitional socio-political processes, reality is complex and best discussed in shades of grey rather than in a binary code of black or white.

Recently, there have been noteworthy efforts to provide the increasing number of retired African presidents with meaningful tasks. The idea is to neutralise their influence in domestic politics where they tend to undermine subsequent governments. If possible, they are therefore to be turned into constructive promoters of good governance. This is a daunting challenge, as in many cases their rule was not necessarily marked by good governance. It is, of course, promising to witness how fast the number of peaceful and constitutionally anchored transfers of political power is growing in Africa.

On the other hand, recent moves by some political leaders still in power (notably Museveni in Uganda, Kérékou in Benin and even Obasanjo in Nigeria) seem to suggest that the willingness to leave office in due course and according to the rule of the law is still not generally accepted. Those holding high public office need to fully internalise the notion of limited terms.

Notwithstanding such visible setbacks and disappointing manoeuvres, it is undeniable that more leaders bow out constitutionally than in the past. This trend may not yet be strong enough to warrant lasting democracy in the countries concerned. It does, however, indicate substantial progress from the generation of despots at the head of cleptocratic regimes that held sway over Africa not so long ago. AU, NEPAD and APRM may well contribute to increasing the notion of shared responsibility among the elites of African countries and strengthen the adherence to certain principles of democracy and human rights. We should beware of shrugging our shoulders and disregarding all change as meaningless and merely symbolical. After all, processes of social transformation have always been time-consuming.



Dr. Henning Melber
is research director of the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. Parts of this article were prepared as an input paper for a meeting of Nordic and African Foreign Ministers earlier this year.
Henning.Melber@nai.uu.se