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Catch 22

Difficult cooperation with
fragile states


05/2006
  

[ Donor harmonisation ]

Difficult cooperation with fragile states

“Stay engaged, but in a different way.” That is the consensus among donors on how to address fragile states. Because of poverty and risks to population, neighbouring countries and international community, there can obviously be no question of withdrawing from a failing or disintegrating state. But it is equally obvious that conventional approaches to cooperation do not make sense here. The donor community is therefore working on a set of principles to harmonise cooperation with fragile sates, prevent conflict and build institutions.


[ By Ludgera Klemp ]

In the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” of, March 2005, donor and recipient countries emphasised their commitment to stay engaged in fragile states for the long term (paragraphs 37 – 39). The aim is to help to build and strengthen legitimate, efficient and stable institutions. At present, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is busy drafting a set of principles for cooperation with fragile states. This process is moderated and coordinated by the Fragile States Group (FSG), known up to May 2005 as the LAP (Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships).

Around 14 percent of the people in this world (870 million) – and nearly a third of those living below the absolute poverty line – reside in fragile states. In the countries concerned, basic public services are limited (such as health, education or justice). Ethnic groups, religious communities and women suffer discrimination – with devastating consequences for their security and even survival. In fragile states, the UN Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction are unlikely to be attained. So-called “good performers” and countries with moderate income levels receive disproportionately more official development assistance (ODA) than do fragile states (Levin, Dollar, 2005). Moreover, fragile states prominently figure among the “pockets of exclusion” and “aid orphans”, whose ODA receipts are marked by high volatility.

The DAC debate initially focused on “poorly performing countries”. That term was later replaced with “difficult partnerships” to avoid derogatory connotations. In the meantime, the phrase “fragile states” has won general acceptance among donors. Since 2002, the World Bank has spoken of “low-income countries under stress” in a similar sense.

According to the DAC definition, fragile countries are marked by “lack of political commitment and weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies”. The heterogeneous nature of the countries concerned makes it hard to come up with a more precise definition. Failed states, disintegrating states, weak states, consolidating states – this continuum allows no clear classification by type or stage. Specific circumstances are crucial. Distinctions need to be made, for example, between countries where the political will for development-oriented governance is undermined by corruption and countries where, in the aftermath of conflict, political and administrative capacities simply do not exist.

States are fragile if they fail to adequately perform core functions for their people domestically and, internationally, core functions as members of the international community. Such countries can be a source of trans-border destabilisation.

Together with the World Bank, the UNDP and the EU, the FSG is working on “Principles for good international engagement in fragile states”. The first draft, produced last year, proposes the following imperatives for bilateral and multilateral donor engagement, among others:
- take context as the stating point,
- move from reaction to prevention,
- focus on state- building as the central objective,
- align with local priorities and/or systems,
- recognise the political-security-development nexus,
- promote coherence between donor government agencies,
- do no harm,
- mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context (humanitarian aid, long-term support),
- act fast to take advantage of windows of opportunity, and
- avoid pockets of exclusion.

These principles reflect the fundamentals of the Paris Declaration. However, they are particularly hard to apply in the case of fragile states because donors cannot trust local government institutions to be reliable partners. At present, pilot-studies are underway to test application of the principles in nine fragile states: Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Nepal, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe, Solomon Islands and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Germany supports this approach. On the basis of the experience yielded, the High Level Meeting of ministers from the DAC members will approve a set of binding principles in spring next year.

Moreover, FSG working groups have been formed to look at the following issues in particular:
- resource flows (with the goal of making today’s highly volatile flows to fragile states more transparent and predictable),
- whole of government approaches (to integrate more closely foreign, development and security policies) and
- service delivery (for basic social services to benefit people directly, a crucial entry points for development cooperation in fragile states).


First findings

The early lessons learned from the pilot countries show that it is possible to work in a frame of reference in line with the Paris Declaration. However, a number of problems have become apparent. Sadly, some things that seem matter-of-course are not easily implemented, including dialogue between bi- and multilateral donors, multi-donor strategies as well as coordination and harmonisation of (financial) instruments. Coordination of different briefs (foreign policy, defence, development) and the sequencing of assistance activities (emergency relief, creation of sustainable institutions) also fail to work smoothly in too many cases. However, programmes that merely tackle symptoms rarely turn out to be sustainable. It is essential to assess governance in quantitative terms. Doing so must be based on analysing specific criteria in order to be able to identify “drivers of change” rather than only coming up with data on development-orientation and political legitimacy in any given country.

So far, experience in the pilot countries confirms the key role of civil society for political change – because where governments lack political will, other “drivers of change” need to be identified. Typically, non-governmental organisations will do relief work wherever governments fail. Nonetheless, however, promotion of (international) NGOs must not stand in the way of strengthening “country ownership” and building state institutions. Only in exceptional cases will it be acceptable to “bypass governments” – for instance, when humanitarian hardship must be addressed.

Another issue of strategic importance is the responsibility of private enterprise to prevent illegal business activities and to fight corruption as shadow economies and illegal extraction of resources tend to contribute to destabiliasation. They undermine public revenues (and thus the financing capacity of the countries concerned) and prevent transparent budget policies for development.

What has not yet been resolved is the question of what to do about non-OECD actors. Notable examples include China, India, Saudi Arabia and Russia. They are funding significant investments in the pilot countries, many of their projects are to their own, specific interests. Such activity can attenuate budding transformation processes. Non-OECD actors often resist closer coordination and stress the principle of non-interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries. OECD donors, by contrast, are seeking ways to enter into dialogue with these governments.

What is also becoming evident is a certain helplessness in regard to the promotion of human rights. Social inequality, the denial of taking part in political, business and cultural affairs as well as discrimination along gender and other lines are closely linked to state fragility. The majority of people in fragile states have no access to health services, education, economic resources, social security or the political representation. Indeed, in many cases, their very survival is threatened. The more firmly human rights (including economic rights) are enshrined in the catalogue of principles – as is already the case in BMZ’s plan of action –, the more success will crown the efforts of the international donor community and partner governments.


Ludgera Klemp
works in the Governance, Democracy, Human Rights, Gender Division of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). This article expresses her personal view.
ludgera.klemp@bmz.bund.de