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Contributions from
the Column
Focus
In most countries, populations are ageing
Fast track change: Chinese realities
The urgency of family planning
Small cities will have to carry the heaviest burden
06/2005
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“In most countries,
populations are ageing”
Since the 1960s, the rapid growth of humankind has been a matter of great concern. Even though the global population is still increasing, this worry is fading as demographers expect our species to start declining some time in the not too far future. Sergei Scherbov of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis near Vienna and the Vienna Institute of Demography elaborated on the matter in a conversation with D+C/E+Z.
[ Interview with Sergei Scherbov ]
You predict, that the world’s population will stop growing by the mid of this century. Why are you so sure about that?
What we do is present a probabilistic projection. We do not simply extrapolate data from past years. Rather, we base our prognosis on developments which are likely to happen. Then we calculate the probability of certain outcomes. One of our strongest statements is that there is an 86 percent likelihood of world population peaking in this century. That is a very robust result. We also do not believe that humankind will grow beyond 9.5 or perhaps 10 billion people, although we can not rule this out completely. There is a pretty big chance of that being the maximum level because fertility is declining in many countries. It is rapidly declining in China, where it is already lower than in some European countries. Fertility is also in decline in India, where women only have 3.1 children on average rather than seven or eight as they did when the country became independent in 1947. Fertility is sinking almost everywhere. And that is why, eventually, the world population will stop growing.
Why are fertility rates going down?
This is a multi-faceted phenomenon. But if you want to single out one major reason, I think that will be education. Let’s return to the example of India. If you compare Indian women with different educational levels, you will be amazed how big their difference is in terms of fertility. People with high educational backgrounds have far fewer children. The number of children that Indian women with higher education have on average is close to the replacement level. In most countries that would be near 2.06, but it is higher in India because of high child mortality.
But aren’t there other factors besides education? Basically, one has the impression that higher standards of living, urbanisation, better health services and whatever else you might consider as signs of modernisation go along with lower fertility.
All these issues are closely correlated. And female education is probably the most important factor.
Your prognosis is based on various assumptions. Wouldn’t it be a safer bet to extrapolate data from the past? That would provide an empirical base.
Not really. Extrapolation makes sense over the short run and only if we believe that behaviour is not changing. But we know that reproductive patterns are evolving and we are dealing with a time span of many decades. In such a context, extrapolation is very unreliable. Demographic trends in the past two hundred years were linked to two phenomena: longevity and fertility. On the one hand, people have tended to live longer, while birth rates only declined slowly. While populations expanded fast in Western Europe during and after the Industrial Revolution, birth rates have only fallen below replacement level in the second half of the past century. Most other countries are following this pattern – but at a far greater speed.
Is there a region in the world to which this pattern of longer life-spans and fewer children does not apply?
Well, life expectancy has actually fallen in Russia, Ukraine, Belo-Russia and some other countries in Eastern Europe. Last year, the life expectancy of a new born Russian boy was only 59 years – down from 66 some years ago. In the 1960s, life expectancy in the Soviet Union equalled that of the USA. For Russians, that is a dramatic decline. The figures are similar for Ukraine, although slightly better. On the other hand, fertility remains very low in these countries. Ukraine has one of the lowest rates in the world – around 1.17 children per woman. The Russian figure has recently edged up slightly from 1.2 back to 1.3.
If fewer children are born and people die earlier, the populations must be shrinking.
Obviously. In Russia, it is going down by an annual number of 750.000. And we must take into account that there is immigration to Russia, so otherwise the population would decrease even faster. Mortality rates are also going up in some countries of sub-Saharan Africa because of HIV/AIDS. That disease is particularly dramatic as it affects the sexually active generation, the fertile generation in other words. And even though fertility rates in Africa remain relatively high, they have also begun to drop.
HIV/AIDS is not only prevalent in Africa.
Some experts say, that many countries in Asia, including China and India, are also heading
for big problems.
That may be the case, but it hasn’t happened yet.
Our estimates are not based on HIV/AIDS affecting Asia the way it is affecting Africa. If, however, something like that should happen, world population would peak earlier and at a lower level than we project so far.
Is religion an important factor? Aren’t Muslim societies, for instance, particularly prone to high population growth?
Not necessarily. It is true that most Arab countries, along with Pakistan, Bangladesh or Indonesia
still are above the replacement level. Nonetheless, fertility rates have been dropping in most of them and particularly so in Indonesia, where educational efforts have been quite successful. Tunisia, on the other hand, is an Arab country, where women, on average, already have fewer than two children. According to the most recent studies, Iran has also fallen below the replacement level and there is reason to believe that this might also be the case for Turkey. In Russia, the Tartars are predominantly Muslim, and their fertility has been far below the replacement level for a long time.
Which developing countries have fertility rates below the replacement level today?
Quite a few. I’ve already mentioned China, by far the most populous country. The list also includes Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, South Korea and several countries that were former Soviet Republics in Asia. It also includes Cuba, Costa Rica as well as Trinidad and Tobago in Central America and Brazil in South America. Moreover, many transition countries of the former Warsaw Pact have low fertility rates. This is where you find the lowest rates on earth.
Basically, you expect humankind to keep growing until the mid of the century. Why will that happen even though fertility is decreasing? Are life expectancies rising so fast?
Life expectancy is still growing in developed countries – by about two years per decade. In many developing countries, it is also growing as living conditions improve. But there is also another phenomenon, which we call population momentum. Populations keep growing for a long time even after fertility rates have dropped below replacement levels, because, initially, there are still very many young people. Girls that are born today, will only have children themselves in the decades to come. Therefore, there is always a time lag before lower fertility rates result in decreasing populations. For the same reason, populations of member countries of the European Union would continue to decline – without migration – for quite some time even if fertility were to bounce back to 2.06 children per woman, from roughly 1.5 today. As relatively few children have been born in the past two decades, there are only relatively few potential young mothers and, therefore, the general trend cannot be reversed in the short run.
As a general rule, we must expect fertility rates to drop below the replacement level in the course of development?
Demographic change is a very slow process. We know that the Industrial Revolution initially triggered a population explosion because of rising life expectancies. Later, fertility rates started to drop. We cannot tell whether there is some kind of “final” fertility rate for advanced nations. The data we have seem to suggest that fertility rates could probably be stabilised around 1.8 children per woman or so. Most experts agree on that estimate – and that figure would be somewhat above the European level today.
Are there advanced nations with fertility rates of 2.06 children per woman?
The United States are around the replacement level.
What sets the USA apart from Western Europe or Japan?
I think that is, first of all, the high proportion of the Hispanic population with, on average, a quite high fertility. Immigrants normally adapt to their host country after some generations, but that takes time and birth rates are still higher in Mexico than they are among the white population in the US. African Americans also have a higher fertility level than do Caucasians in the States. It is probably the ethnic composition along with high immigration that sets the US apart. However, whites in the USA have also somewhat higher fertility than the people of the
European countries.
What should European governments do?
It is very difficult to stimulate fertility politically. In the European Union, for instance, it would be very unpopular among women’s rights groups to demand a certain number of children. But there are democratic policies that work. Scandinavian countries as well as France, for example, do much in the terms of public child care, reducing the burden on mothers. Another approach is to improve the employment opportunities for mothers by legal means. In any case, advanced countries with good child care facilities have higher birth rates than those where public services leave much to be wanted – as Germany or Italy for instance. Another approach might be to design policies that would entice women to have their children earlier. So far, women have been postponing motherhood. Some only have children in their late 30s. If they all were to have their children in their 20s, that would improve the demographic situation even if they did not have more children in total.
But surely it is not desirable to raise fertility rates internationally. Isn’t it a good thing that our crowded planet is reaching a point where there will not be many more people?
Different regions have different problems. In Europe, the population would decline without immigration. People normally don’t immediately experience world-wide trends, they have to cope with what is happening around them. Fast population growth poses problems and so do shrinking populations. What matters is to deal adequately with what is happening. Policies should not be same everywhere.
But since the 1960s, the main worry was always the “population bomb” to quote an influential book by Paul Ehrlich. Are you telling us to start worrying instead about dwindling populations – for instance in China?
I don’t think that the absolute numbers matter very much. It isn’t important whether we have one billion or 1.4 billion people in China – or only 800 million. What matters is the age structure of the population, and decline has impacts on the structure. We must face the fact that, in most countries, populations are ageing. How do we support elderly people? Can we provide adequate medical care? We have to restructure the whole economy and provide innovative social services. That is what matters – not the number itself.
So your basic message to all countries is to improve social services?
Yes, the basic message is that it is necessary to adjust to a changing age composition. We have to adapt to the fact that we will have a much larger share of senior citizens in the future. We are speaking of daunting tasks, because, so far, not even the most advanced nations have found solutions. But the mere fact that there will be fewer people does not alarm me personally. What is important is that people live in a good condition, that they live lives worthy of human
beings.
Does immigration to rich nations exacerbate the problems of poor countries?
At first sight, it might seem so. And it may actually do so over the long run. So far, however, I don’t think it is an important issue. Immigrants, after all, do normally support their families back home. Countries can economically benefit from ex-patriot communities. If that is the case, migration does not exacerbate their immediate demographic problems. You see, unemployed youth do not really help to alleviate problems of ageing.
Is there any general rule of what might make it easier to cope with demographic change?
As I said, the basic message is that all countries have to adjust. If change is slow and undramatic that will probably be easier than if we experience sudden declines and rapid ageing. In the same sense, fast population growth is also problem prone. Policies geared to keeping fertility close to the replacement level would probably contribute to minimising social frictions. All summed up, however, we must prepare for the ageing of our population and the end of our species’ growth.
Questions by Hans Dembowski.
Dr. Sergei Scherbov
is a senior research scholar at the Vienna Institute of Demography of Austrian Academy of Sciences and at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) based near Vienna. IIASA has member organisations in 16 different nations.
sergei.scherbov@oeaw.ac.at
Further reading:
Wolfgang Lutz, Brian C. O’Neill and Sergei Scherbov, 2003: Europe’s
Population at a Turning Point, in: Science, Vol 299, p. 1991-92
Wolfgang Lutz, Warren C. Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov (Eds.), 2004:
The End of World Population Growth in the 21st Century. New Challenges for Human Capital Formation and Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan.
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