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Contributions from
the Column
Tribune
Addiction blocks development
Escalation of ethnic politics
Europe must speak with one voice
Systemic inability
7/2004
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[ Afghanistan ]
Escalation of ethnic politics
Afghan and international actors agreed on a roadmap for peace and state-building in Bonn in 2001. So far, that accord has been largely observed. However, consideration of ethnic background in the composition of the transitional government has given political legitimacy to warlords and mujaheddin commanders.
[ By Rangin Dadfar Spanta ]
Most Afghanistan observers agree that the situation in the country, though far from perfect, is certainly better today than it was under the Taliban. Today, some five million children – including a substantial number of girls – attend school. Non-government publications are on sale in Kabul. More than two million refugees have returned to their homes. These are impressive facts, lending weight to the claim that Afghanistan is on the right track politically. However, they paint only part of the picture.
A thorough analysis of the entire process raises serious doubts about its prospects for success. There are no separatist movements in Afghanistan. But social peace and cohesion are threatened by the growing ethnicisation of political life. The chances are decreasing steadily that a democratic solution can be delivered. It would imply the creation of a nation-state with civic principles and institutions, in which all ethnic groups enjoy the same basic rights and freedoms.
One consequence of the failure of the great ideologies of Communism and Islamism is that persons in positions of political and military power today lack a vision that might serve for legitimisation and mobilisation. The take-over by the Taliban, who were mostly Pashtuns, provided a golden opportunity for ethnic politicians to raise their voices. Some had already discovered the issue during the years of Communist rule (1978-1992). Social mobility and societal changes that occurred during the Afghan resistance created the framework for ethnically articulated politics.
By sharing power on the basis of ethnic affiliation, the Afghanistan conference in Bonn in 2001 added impetus to the general ethnicisation of national politics. The elites of the various linguistic and cultural groups deliberately fanned the flames of ethnic conflicts. The Loya Jirga of December 2003 basically marked the culmination of that process, establishing ethnic affiliation as a basis for mobilising support or opposition. The entire state-building project is now overshadowed by ethnic issues. The reasons are obvious. Afghanistan’s political class is caught in a crisis of legitimacy – in which ethnicisation plays two roles: it legitimises actions and mobilises ethnic groups en bloc.
The warlord network
Ethnicisation is a godsend for the warlords. Their military and economic relevance has increased steadily since the Taliban regime was overturned. Although President Hamid Karzai took some warlords into his government, he was not able to integrate them into his team and form a cabinet of real national unity. As a consequence, the powerful provincial princes act and react like sovereign sultans. They maintain private armies and have their own financial resources. Many have more soldiers under arms now than when they stormed the cities after the US air force had bombed out the Taliban. They now command strong militias – and they are blocking the process of disarmament and demilitarisation.
It is often pointed out that some warlords act as a stabilising factor, even as pillars of the reconstruction process. This is a dangerous hypothesis – because if the partial stability realised under the warlords is seen as an acceptable state of affairs, the entire state-building project will be torpedoed. The warlord network is ultimately the greatest obstacle to that undertaking. If it is not overcome, the possibility of achieving broad-based stability and peace will indeed be remote.
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the warlords have found new ways of perpetuating their power. In the days of the Taliban, they got most of their money from direct foreign aid and the sale of gemstones. Now, they also reap profits from operations made possible by the war economy, engaging in activities such as drug production, arms trafficking, smuggling, misuse of international aid, robbery, extortion. Considering the international business links they forge in the process, it makes sense to speak of a "globalisation of crime".
The prominent warlords are not the only ones involved in the war economy. At their side are a host of minor commanders, who basically act as a network. In the mesh of common and conflicting interests, loose alliances are formed for mutual support. At other times, actors return to feuding. But when in doubt, and confronted with an "outside threat", they stand united.
Warlords remain loyal to the central state as long as it does not interfere in the "internal" affairs of their fiefdoms. They do not question the continuity of the central state nor its territorial integrity. For one thing, its existence secures the flow of international aid; for another, it enables various actors to stay outside the spotlight of international law. Moreover, the national state protects warlords from the unpopular accusation of separatism. After all, warlords did acquire a kind of national legitimacy by participating in the anti-Soviet resistance and through their ethnic roots.
Talibanism conserved
Equally troubling is the fact that, while the fall of the Taliban regime did mark a defeat for Islamism, it did not imply its bitter end. The Taliban project relied to a considerable extent on the recruitment of former mujaheddin. Ideological and political affinities are obvious and were reflected in hostility towards women and in disregard for human rights. In 1995, before the Taliban took control of Kabul, the Ulema Council (council of clerics) published a code of conduct, which enjoyed the backing of the Taliban. The establishment of the religious police, the banishment of women from public life, the prohibition of music and other curbs on personal freedoms were introduced during the rule of the mujaheddin. They were then adopted by the Taliban and enforced with un-precedented resolution in a savagely repressive regime.
Even today, however, high positions in major state institutions – such as the judicial authority – are still occupied by people with views very similar to those of the Taliban. In the regions too, although the Taliban militias have largely lost the grip they once had, Talibanism is still in evidence. In some areas, a considerable number of schools have been set up as a platform for fanatical religious teachings.
On May 23, 2004, the leaders of the former mujaheddin got together with the powerful warlords in Kabul. That meeting took place after a series of secret talks between the country's president and the leaders of the forces that had fought against the Soviets and Taliban. The commanders had agreed to support Karzai's candidacy in the forthcoming presidential elections – on certain conditions. These were summed up as follows by the noted fundamentalist A. Sayyaf:
– preservation of the values of jihad;
– prevention of the spread of non-Islamic values;
– positions for mujaheddin in the national army, the security forces and state institutions;
– ban on propaganda against the Afghan jihad.
The concept involves forming a government after the elections this fall, in which, according to mujaheddin spokesmen, 60 to 70 percent of the cabinet will consist of representatives of the old Northern Alliance and other mujaheddin groups. It is patently obvious that a weak government in present-day Afghanistan will give prominent cabinet posts to warlord and fundamentalist representatives in the hope of integrating them in the state-building process. While participants say that Karzai agreed to this concept, the president denies any arrangement with warlords.
What needs to be remembered, however, is that the government has neither the concepts nor the institutional backup nor the human resources needed to integrate the warlords and destroy their power base. Also, being made up of groups, which are positively hostile to one another, the government lacks unity. As a consequence, warlords and Islamists set the agenda in Afghanistan today.
One prominent Afghan minister told me in April: "When Mr Karzai speaks Pashtu or Farsi he thinks like a tribal leader. But when he speaks English, he thinks like the President of the Republic." Maybe that is one of the reasons for his strength on the international front – and his weakness in Afghanistan.
Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta
studied in Kabul and Ankara before doing his doctorate in political science at RWTH Aachen University (Germany). He is currently director of the Third World Forum in Aachen. In March 2002, he visited Afghanistan for the first time after 25 years of exile. His most recent trip there was in April this year. rds@3wf.de
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