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Contributions from
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Tribune
Political foundations: promoting democracy
Opium: A triumph of sorts in Thailand
“Khadidja proposed marriage to Mohamad”
07/2005
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[ Narcotics ]
A triumph of sorts in Thailand
Thailand is the unusual example of a country that has succeeded in stopping drug cultivation. Successive governments did so not only by strictly enforcing laws but also by providing for comprehensive development in the northern hill regions. The conditions under which this happened are locally specific. Thailand’s drug problems in general, however, remain unresolved.
[ By Rüdiger Korff and Ruth Sharifa Djedje ]
For all practical purposes, opium production has become irrelevant in Thailand. This is remarkable as poppy cultivation used to be essential for the survival of the indigenous hill peoples that live in the country’s northern regions. Traditionally, they grew opium and sold it to Chinese merchants. Doing so provided income for buying food – particularly rice – and saving for dowries. This worked out well as opium is a relatively undemanding plant, the cultivation of which basically depends on physical labour. Moreover, the product is easily stored and transported.
Historically, drug cultivation in the mountains had little impact on Thai society. The highlands of the Golden Triangle are remote areas, in which state laws and borders were hardly enforced until recently. Opium was traditionally consumed by ethnic Chinese and the drugs trade was controlled by local warlords who did not challenge the formal authority of far-away governments in Bangkok or elsewhere.
Opium has, however, been relevant at the global level for almost two centuries. In the 19th century, the colonial powers – particularly the British East-India company – made profits in the drug trade and defended their privilege of doing so in China in warfare, the so-called “Opium-War”. Back then, opium was hardly consumed in Europe and not considered an issue of public health in London, Paris or other Western capitals.
By the second half of the 20th century, however, that had changed. During the Vietnam war American soldiers became addicts of both opium and heroin. US President Richard Nixon consequently announced a war on drugs in the 1970s. After the military failure in Vietnam, however, this was not a policy Washington could implement by force in South East Asia. Although Thailand’s share in opium production of the “Golden Triangle” was rather small, it was the only opium producing country in the region allied to the West and the regime in Bangkok was not, in principal, opposed to strict law enforcement.
In an ironic historical twist, however, Thailand’s drug traffic at the time was controlled by Kuomintang troops that had been forced out of China during the revolution. These militias had actually survived quite well in Northern Thailand. Initially, they had even enjoyed friendly ties with the CIA. The Thai governments of the time had tolerated them, even considering them something similar to a border police. Moreover, members of the Thai elite were given a share of the drug revenue.
Donor concerns
In the late 70s and early 80s, however, the situation changed. Western donor governments increasingly worried about heroin abuse in their home countries. It proved difficult to stop consumption in rich nations and, quite logically, the idea of suppressing production seemed to make sense. At the time, “rural development” was en vogue as a policy catchword, and the USA and other donors were prepared to support programmes. In Thailand, crop substitution was actively promoted in the 80s. On top of this, neither the authorities in Bangkok nor the CIA had much strategic reason to support the Kuomintang in Thailand anymore.
Nonetheless, crop substitution only really took hold in the 1990s after the Thai government had made massive investments in infrastructure and social services. Attempts to include the hill tribes within a concept of nationhood also contributed to making opium production irrelevant. All summed up, it has not only become viable but actually profitable for farmers in the remote areas to grow vegetables to be sold on Thailand’s urban markets. Road transportation has become sufficiently fast and reliable for this purpose, and the producers have a keen knowledge of the prices they can fetch. At the same time, police repression has drastically increased the risks involved in drug cultivation.
Today, rural people have better access to schools and hospitals. Both provide incentives to integrate with society at large. On the other hand, local culture and tradition are being discouraged – not least in government-run schools with their emphasis on Thai language and manners. This pressure is definitely a mixed blessing for the people involved, but it does serve national inclusiveness. Moreover, Thailand has become more democratic in the process of modernisation and the Constitution of 1998 has devolved important decision-making to regional and local bodies. Civil society organisations have sprung up over the past decades and become influential. Thailand’s formerly “Wild North” is thus becoming a constituent part of a modernising nation.
This is the context in which it became possible to virtually eradicate opium cultivation. It is obvious that repression by military means alone would not have led to the same results. Moreover, it is essential to understand that the Thai government, in spite of the use of considerable force, never took on the drug mafias head on. Armed insurgency would probably have resulted from any such attempt. What happened was that regional mafias withdrew north from Thailand, mostly to Myanmar, and did not have to defend their main source of income by military means.
The end of opium cultivation in Thailand, for that reason, does not mean that all drug problems are solved in the country. To the contrary, the use of heroin temporarily became wide-spread – at the very time that farmers were switching from poppies to non-addictive crops. One reason was that Myanmar-based mafias began marketing their refined product in Thailand. The tribal people that traditionally grew opium had hardly consumed the drug themselves – except for some medical purposes or as a recreational drug for the elderly. That changed as more and more people became addicted to heroin. This trend, moreover, did not only affect local people in the hills but also spread to the sex industries of Bangkok, other cities and tourist destinations exacerbating the challenge of HIV/AIDS.
To a large extent, heroin abuse has in the meantime abated in Thailand. This, however, is not entirely thanks to governmental policies. It is just as much linked to the drug cartels in Myanmar who have discovered metamphetamines as an even more lucrative commodity. This drug is produced in small chemical laboratories in Myanmar and then distributed in Thailand with even fewer logistic problems.
The history of how Thailand ended opium cultivation is obviously locally specific. If it does provide lessons for other drug producing countries it is certainly that forceful repression will not do the job. Developing infrastructure, schools and even a sense of national cohesion are just as vital. As the local drug economy, however, was never vitally threatened and always continued to supply the globalised shadow economy, it is hard to say what would have happened had the mafias ever feared for their very existence. Thailand has, moreover, not become a country free of narcotics abuse – nor has the drug supply on the streets of rich nations been reduced.
Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Korff
is a sociologist. He teaches South-East Asian Studies at Passau University.
ruediger.korff@uni-passau.de
Ruth Sharifa Djedje
is lecturer for Southeast Asian Studies at Passau University.
Djedjeru@yahoo.com
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