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Contributions from
the Column
Books and Media
Europe’s future role in the international order
Rules of thumb: sound case studies
Trade theory: for export, not for consumption
Genetics-discourse:
plenty of contributions – even more readers
Documents:the „resource curse“
8-9/2004
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Rules of thumb: sound case studies
Mir A. Ferdowsi, Volker Matthies (Eds.):
Den Frieden gewinnen.
Zur Konsolidierung von Friedensprozessen in Nachkriegsgesellschaften
[Winning the peace. On consolidating peace processes in post-war societies], Bonn, Dietz 2003, 364 pp., ¤ 12.70, ISBN 3-8012-0325-5
How can wars best be ended so that a lasting peace is ensured? That is the fundamental question that this book is trying to grapple with. Case studies analyse 14 recent civil wars (often with external intervention), in which the source of conflict has been more or less successfully resolved. Civil wars are the most frequent type of war today, but they are more often ended by clashes between states than by negotiation.
In the well-written introduction the editors take issue with the contention that such wars are a new phenomenon. For Matthies and Ferdowsi civil wars are rather an extension of crises stemming from (successful or unsuccessful) state and nation-building. Catch-up efforts of state-building in poor countries occur under unfavourable conditions and are extremely prone to conflict – for instance when a monopoly of power has to be established first of all. Matthies/Ferdowsi criticise as reductionist some attempts to see civil wars as organised crime and to explain them away as war economies. This does not do justice to complex analyses such as those published by David Keen and William Reno. However, apart from that, their critique is a convincing one.
Matthies und Ferdowsi emphasise that any transition to peace is a lengthy process. The point at issue is the order in which the necessary steps should be taken, such as whether the state’s monopoly of power should be consolidated first. The case studies could not conclusively answer this question. The studies on Lebanon and Bosnia indicate that finding an authoritarian solution to the security problem can in some cases be the most important first step. Others (such as Papua New Guinea) on the other hand conclude that the success of the peace process depends more on the early participation of civilian society and on efforts to appease and process the horrors of war. It is clear that the most meaningful path in each case depends on the circumstances of the conflict.
Some conclusions can nonetheless be drawn. Time pressures imposed from outside are not helpful with negotiations. Traditional institutions which are still functional should be included in talks. Peace processes at the grass roots level of society can have a positive influence on negotiations between warlords. On the other hand, solutions are a lot harder to find in places which lack the social strengths needed for mediation, such as in Angola.
The case studies are mainly sound and follow similar patterns of enquiry, which makes comparison easier. However, it doesn’t take long before a feeling of déjà vu appears. At some stage the reader tends to become confused with all the abbreviations and could use a glossary. More and better reproduced maps would also have been helpful. But these things do not affect the basic merit of the book. By studying individual cases, it makes the complicated mechanisms of peace consolidation comprehensible to the reader. It shows that patent remedies can be harmful, but that rules of thumb are constructive. And it reminds us that, like war, peace is not an economic or technical problem, but primarily a political project.
Bernd Ludermann
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