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Letters to the editor
Afghanistan: no shortcut to democracy
11/2004 |
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Comment
Afghanistan: no shortcut to democracy
Afghanistan has voted and the international community is pleased. The chaos that was expected didn’t ensue. Observers say that, on the whole, the election process was acceptable. The candidate backed by the donor countries, Hamid Karzai, will most likely be confirmed in office. However, appearances can be misleading. Right up to election day, there was cheating and deception, and every trick in the book was used to haggle for votes. It will take generations before the rules of democracy will be firmly rooted in Afghan society.
[ By Conrad Schetter ]
At first glance, the presidential election in Afghanistan appears to be an unexpected success for democracy. Voter turnout was high, many women took part and the violence that was feared didn't materialise. However, it would be wrong to conclude that Afghanistan is now standing on a secure democratic ground. The polls were overshadowed by too many irregularities. Even in the planning stages, the electoral commission – made up of Afghan representatives and UN staff – threw all control mechanisms to the wind. The committee turned a blind eye to multiple registrations, to the disregard for age restrictions and to the failure to adequately check identities. Consequently, the number of registered voters greatly exceeded the estimated voting population. Furthermore, the commission accepted that, in the end, the warlords stayed in control of voter registration in the areas they rule. Heedlessness peaked on election day, when what was supposed to be indelible ink to mark voters could, in fact, be easily wiped off.
The argument that you cannot expect a perfect election in a country like Afghanistan overlooks the fact that a lot of Afghans, because of such negligence, question the sincerity with which the international community is supporting democracy in their country. It was to be expected that the presidential candidates would challenge the election because of these mistakes – if only to save face as likely losers. In fact, none of the candidates seriously reckoned they had any chance of toppling the acting (and probably also future) president, Hamid Karzai.
Nevertheless, they will score some hidden victories. Karzai cannot ignore the fact that candidates such as Rashid Dostum or Mohammad Mohaqeq, two of the most powerful warlords in the country, can claim legitimacy after a vote in their favour in the areas they control. Therefore, it is far from obvious that Karzai’s power base will increase noticeably after his confirmation in office. As before, we will have to take into account the individual interests of the warlords outside of Kabul, and they could not care less about the wishes of the people.
Only to a limited extent does the high voter turnout indicate the strengthening of democratic standards. In the cities, it was undoubtedly an expression of the quest for political emancipation. After 35 years, the urban population wanted to exercise their democratic right again. In the rural regions, on the other hand, the majority of Afghans do not have the necessary education to consciously take part in a democratic procedure. Most Afghans cannot tell the difference between a president and a king, nor do they know what it actually means to vote. Furthermore, the conditions for an individual, political volition were unfavourable. After all, the local potentates and warlords dictated who was to be elected in their areas of control. All candidates, therefore, had spent months touring the countryside, promising the local leaders positions or other benefits.
The international community steamrollered the Afghanistan’s first presidential election through with great haste and under a lot of pressure. The haste was not so much in the interest of Afghanistan but rather due to the wishes of the US administration, which wanted to come up with a foreign affairs success story before facing elections itself. Now the speed should be reduced and more time and energy invested in setting up reliable democratic institutions and in removing the die-hard warlord structures. The elections on 9. October have proven that democracy is possible in Afghanistan. However, they have also clearly shown that the process of becoming a democracy will take generations.
Dr. Conrad Schetter
is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Development Research in Bonn. His latest publications are the books “Kleine Geschichte Afghanistans” (A Brief History of Afghanistan) (München: Beck) and “Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan” (Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Afghanistan) (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag). c.schetter@uni-bonn.de
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