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Editorial
12/2006 |
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Demanding duty
We know what does not work. Sadly, what happens – and disheartens – in peace-keeping practice shows there is a constant need for regular reminders of key empirical findings.
When a foreign force’s monopoly of power creates security only in the capital, resentment grows in the provinces and long-dismissed militias or newly formed combat groups can gain strength.
– When occupation forces withdraw to the safety of military bases and rather kill harmless pedestrians than endanger a single soldier of their own, they will not win the hearts of the people.
– When electricity, water and other modern amenities remain as scarce after an intervention as they were before, long-suffering people remain disappointed.
– When whole sections of the population see no economic prospects for themselves, hatred and frustration continue to smoulder.
– When foreign experts with no feel for local conditions take all decisions, no new, bottom-up social contract can emerge.
– When security is interpreted and implemented only according to military terms, old conflicts easily flare up again as soon as the international contingents leave.
For good reason, development experts complain that protracted civil challenges are often under-estimated in peace missions. Indeed, it takes much more than quick elections to make democracy credible. Where the rule of law is supposed to bring violence under control, armed hunts on culprits and a sprinkling of spectacular judicial verdicts will never do the job. Trust grows slowly, but is shattered fast. Therefore, it takes time to bring about reconciliation and create institutions capable of maintaining peace, be it in Kosovo or Timor Leste.
For good reason, security experts are similarly irritated. It is still widely underestimated just how hard it is to establish any new monopoly of force in a crisis region. In Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, that was never even attempted with country-wide scope. Under these conditions, it is naïve to expect brilliant results. Overstretched troops will hardly serve as perfect models of peacefulness. They were trained to fight, after all, not to serve as police officers or culturally sensitive development staff.
The fact that neither civilian progress nor the implementation of a stable monopoly of force may be neglected means that peace missions, if they are really supposed to succeed, are demanding in terms of funds, staff and time. Cutting corners on any relevant ingredient not only puts the entire mission at risk; the credibility of the international community is always at stake as well, and especially that of the donor countries. Because of their massive influence, immense wealth and historical responsibilities, they play special roles in world affairs.
The governments of the rich world need to rise to the challenge of making peace and development possible all over the world. Globalisation needs to be fair if prosperity – even in affluent regions – is to grow and be secured. After all, particularly the rich countries depend on international trade and access to expanding markets. And as terror or migration show, instability anywhere in the world can directly affect citizens of Western Europe and North America. Politicians should be able to convince voters of such simple truths.
Dr. Hans Dembowski
Editor in Chief of D+C Development and Cooperation/E+Z Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit
euz.editor@fsd.de
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