Summary

The 1990s saw the beginning of an intense international debate on the contribution that development cooperation (DC) can make to stable and peaceful development in conflict situations. Development agencies are trying to gain a better understanding of their options and limits. This includes not only the role played by development cooperation in easing or resolving conflicts, but also its role in increasing or even generating conflicts. This article deals with experience and findings of German DC in six countries.

By and large, the direct influence which German DC and the whole of the international donor community can have on conflict situations is limited. Conflict recognition and the flow of information are important for DC in conflict situations. In some cases the recording, forwarding and processing of information proved to be deficient and sometimes highly problematical. On the whole, there has been a discernible tendency in German DC for sensitivity to conflict situations to increase in the 1990s. Despite this positive tendency, DC actors are often insufficiently aware of conflict situations. Conceptually, not enough attention has been paid to this aspect; there are no real "conflict strategies" for the countries concerned. 

German DC pursued very different strategies in the countries studied. Two patterns of behaviour can generally be distinguished in this context: on the one hand, countries or phases in which German governmental DC tried to act independently of the actual or potential conflict. On the other hand, it is possible to identify countries or individual phases in which German DC made a conscious effort to help prevent crises or resolve conflicts.

The six country studies differ in their conclusions on the overall impact ("macro level") of German DC on potential and actual conflict situations. Three (Kenya, Mali and Sri Lanka) are, on the whole, rather positive. One (Rwanda) reaches a generally negative conclusion. Another (Ethiopia) is, by and large, ambivalent in its findings, and yet another (El Salvador) concludes that, altogether, no direct impact can be detected. All the studies identify opposing tendencies (ambivalence); in other words, in each case German DC may exacerbate potential or actual conflict situations as well as make positive contributions.

Development Cooperation and Violent Conflicts

The Ongoing Debate

The 1990s saw the beginning of an intensive international debate on the contribution that development cooperation can make to stable and peaceful development in conflict and crisis situations. Development agencies are trying to gain a better understanding of their options and limits. This includes not only the role played by development cooperation in easing or resolving conflicts, but also its role in increasing or even generating tensions or conflicts. Not at least the Secretary general of the United Nations has called for a "Culture of Prevention" (Annan 1999).

The debate has led to a number of research efforts as well as concepts for development agencies. Recent examples are the findings of the research project of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) which were edited by Forman/Patrick (eds., 2000), the study of Anderson (1999) on "Do no harm", the book "Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Donor Community" (Ball, 1996) and the yearbook of the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) (Cross ed., 1998). Another example is a series of case studies on the limits and scope for the use of development cooperation incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations (Uvin, 1999).

Various conceptual papers have meanwhile been published, and some experience has been gained at project and programme level. At international level this has been reflected particularly in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/OECD's Development Assistance Committee/DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (OECD, 1997), which were completed in 1997. In Germany the debate has led, inter alia, to the concept paper Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Krisenvorbeugung (De-vel-opment Cooperation and Crisis Prevention) drawn up by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development/BMZ (BMZ, 1997). 

So far, however, there have been hardly any empirical studies of the role that development cooperation as a whole has played, or might play, in specific conflict and crisis situations or of the requirements that must be met if it is to make a successful contribution to crisis prevention. However, some empirical evidences are available like the document on the World Bank's experiences (World Bank, 1998) and the conference report of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC, 2000).

Objective of a German Evaluation

The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development  commissioned an evaluation on the impact of development cooperation in conflict situations. The study was conducted in 1998 and 1999. 

The objective of the evaluation entitled "Impact of development cooperation in conflict situations" was to study the role that German development cooperation has hitherto played in conflicts. Both aspects which have prevented crises and aspects which have exacerbated conflicts were considered in this context. Factors indicating that development coopera-tion may well contribute to crisis prevention or conflict resolution were identified.

The evaluation consisted of six internal country studies. Each country was investigated by groups of experts in teams of two. The findings were published in a summary (cross-section) report (Klingebiel, 1999).

The six internal country studies concern Ethiopia, El Salvador, Kenya, Mali, Sri Lanka and Rwanda. Various criteria were applied in the choice of the countries. Consideration was given to the geographical distribution (inclusion of experience gained in African, Asian and Latin American countries) and the different phases of conflict(1)  played an important part in the selection. A further criterion was whether German development cooperation plays an appreciable role in the country concerned.

• Kenya was chosen as an example of countries that have a clearly recognisable potential for conflict, although – despite various isolated violent events – it has not yet escalated into a full-blown conflict.
• Sri Lanka was chosen as an example of coun-tries currently affected by civil war.
• Ethiopia, El Salvador, Mali and Rwanda(2)  were chosen as examples of countries in post-war situations. The choice of countries illustrates the very different situations and the wide variations in the continuing potential for conflict and violence.

Study Method

The cross-section report used the six internal evaluations as its main sources. In addition, meetings (with representatives of the BMZ, the Foreign Office, the implementing agencies and the authors of the evaluations) on the different case studies were taken into account.

Most of the information for the internal country studies was obtained from

• country and project files held by the BMZ, German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW; German Bank for Reconstruction and Development),(3)
• generally available publications (newspapers, academic reports, etc.),
• interviews conducted in Germany with representatives of the BMZ, the Federal Foreign Office, other governmental development cooperation agencies, non-governmental organizations (Churches, Political Foundations, etc.) and relevant research institutes and experts,
• interviews conducted in the various countries with the embassies and development cooperation actors,
• interviews with the warring parties and the government of the concerned countries.

Interviews and plausibility analyses were to be the tools for impact analysis.

On this basis the evaluations were to be assessed to see whether and to what extent development cooperation as a whole and/or individual project activities had been able to help influence or defuse potential or actual conflict situations.

It should also be pointed out that the cross-section appraisal faced various specific methodological problems. They included the very "broad approach" adopted for the evaluation, which proved to be a challenge, particularly when it came to compiling the summary. What was examined was not a specific measure, a specific sector, a specific period, a specific region, a specific instrument or a specific implementing agency but a combination of all these dimensions. An added problem was that in many respects new methodological and substantive ground had to be broken. Thus, although the "policy dialogue" and its impacts, for example, were to be covered by the research, they have yet to be analysed in specific studies. The breadth of the questions raised meant that the individual evaluations could not be expected to be strictly systematic or complete, given the very complex terms of reference. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the ambitious evaluation objective undoubtedly had many advantages and produced findings that could probably not have been achieved with a "narrow" and more "standardized" approach.

Some Definitions

• Two key terms are used in the present article:(4)
  Development cooperation: The term development cooperation refers to flows which are qualified by the OECD as "Official Development Assistance" (ODA): ODA are grants or loans to developing countries and are (i) undertaken by the official sector, (ii) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective, (iii) at concessional financial terms. In addition, the term development cooperation refers to concessional private activities of non-governmental organizations (like Churches, Political Foundations, etc.).
• Conflict: In this article conflict stands for violent conflict. The term reveals how a society or states deal with conflicts of interest. Violent conflict means a society's or states' (partial) inability to cope with conflicts of interest in a cooperative and non-violent manner. Sporadic or frequent violence may occur as a means of dealing with conflicts of interests (see Klingebiel et al., 2000). 

Given the importance of the term conflict for this article, it should be said that conflicts are vital components of societies and essential elements of development; they should not therefore be prevented per se. The aim is rather to contribute to their peaceful and constructive resolution or to help prevent them from being resolved by violent means.

Some General Observations: Settlement and De-escalation of Conflicts and External Influences

Few general patterns providing clues to the structures of conflict resolution and de-escalation can be identified.(5)  Even in countries that note positive tendencies over long periods or for some time a widespread phenomenon of reversibility and fragility can be detected: there is usually continuing uncertainty about steps that might lead or have already led to de-escalation and about wars that have ended.

In at least some cases (Mali and El Salvador) the following factors played an important part in the settlement of conflicts: (1) a no-win situation, (2) the high cost of war, (3) external actors had no interest in seeing the war continue and (4) attempts at mediation from outside and within.
What influence external actors have on conflict situations differs from one case to another and depends partly on the time and the regional environment. Although all the conflict situations studied were "internal" conflicts or civil wars, almost all had something to do with the regional environment.
External actors were sometimes crucially important for the course and outcome of conflicts; in various cases this also had major repercussions for German policy. The USA's massive economic and military aid, for example, had a serious influence on the civil war in El Salvador.

External actors' (non-military) attempts to bring influence to bear with a view to de-escalating conflicts or ending wars – such as attempts at mediation and diplomatic pressure – have differed in the impacts they have had. Many are likely to have been of secondary or subsidiary importance (as in the case of Mali and Sri Lanka), but some may have been decisive (e.g. in Kenya through efforts to advance democratization).

Conflict Recognition and the Flow of Information

In principle, information relevant to conflicts can be gathered and processed at three levels: (1) at project level, (2) at the level of the embassy and local development cooperation offices and (3) at headquarters level (Foreign Office, BMZ and implementing agencies). In some cases the recording, forwarding and processing of information proved to be deficient and, to some extent, highly problematical (Rwanda). In other cases the system worked satisfactorily on the whole.

In some countries potential sources of conflict had been overlooked or underrated, and informa-tion relevant to conflicts had not been recorded by the embassies; in some instances there was a tendency to avoid any attitude critical of the government. Adequate assessment of information by the actors concerned (Foreign Office and BMZ) was not always ensured.

Conflict situations are often of no real interest to development cooperation projects and pro-grammes or to the implementing agencies unless they had a direct impact on the technical implementation of a measure (safety of the project staff, etc.). Conflicts are often perceived as a "disruptive factor" over which little influence can be exercised and which the actors involved believe should be excluded as far as possible from their own development cooperation activities.

In the recording, forwarding and interpretation of information four problems can be identified: (1) the system features a wealth of information and, above all, inconsistent information; actors may tend to eliminate inconsistencies by resorting to certain mechanisms (e.g. selective perception) in their reporting ("cognitive dissonance"); (2) the local structures (e.g. projects,  GTZ office, embassy) tend to be reluctant to refer to conflict situations; (3) projects endeavour to shield themselves from the context of the conflict: staff do not want "their" project impaired by the unfavourable environment; (4) development cooperation measures fail to forge a link between local conditions and the national or regional situation where a conflict is concerned.

From the experience gained in the countries studied various approaches to improving the flow of information within the Federal Government and the recognition of conflicts can be identified: a review of the ways in which embassies obtain and forward information, better conflict recognition and forwarding of information by project personnel and local development coopera-tion offices, and improved analysis by the BMZ of the tendency of some countries to plunge into crisis.

Table 1: Levels of Information Gathering, Transmission and Evaluation in German Bilateral Development Cooperation

Project level: measures taken by the GTZ, the German Development Service/DED and other implement-ing agencies; also some information obtained from non-governmental organizations Country coordination and representation level: German embassy, GTZ office , DED representation, etc. Headquarters level in Germany: Foreign Office, GTZ, KfW, DED, etc.

Source: Klingebiel (1999: 8)

Strategies of German Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations

German development cooperation pursued very different strategies in the countries studied. Two patterns of behaviour can generally be distinguished in this context: on the one hand, countries or phases in which official German development cooperation tried to act independently of the actual or potential conflict. The reactive adjustments due to the conflict that were nonetheless necessary and were made in these situations are reflected, for example, in the withdrawal of development cooperation personnel because of the security situation and in the impossibility of measures being taken in certain parts of the country because of civil war. On the other hand, it is possible to identify countries or individual phases in which German development cooperation made a deliberate attempt to help prevent crises or resolve conflicts. This strategy of explicit sensitivity to conflicts takes many different forms, examples being a concept or strategy for preventing or resolving conflicts (in connection with the country concept, for instance), the issues raised during a policy dialogue and specific development cooperation measures designed to prevent or resolve conflicts. In most of the countries studied "mixed conflict strategies" which contain elements of reactive conflict-related adjustments and reveal explicit sensitivity to conflict had clearly been adopted in German development cooperation. Such strategies are, however, largely the outcome of an ongoing process and less the expression of explicit strategic planning.

Explicitly Conflict-related Development Cooperation Measures

Various explicitly conflict-related projects and programmes (measures to demobilize and reintegrate combatants, programme packages for the social, political and economic stabilization of certain regions, etc.) of official German development cooperation were assisted in most of the countries studied. In conflict-related projects a particularly heavy commitment is shown by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and especially the Political Foundations and the Churches in the cases studied. The measures taken by NGOs differ widely, since some operate in substantive spheres and even, in some cases, regions (such as areas of Sri Lanka controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam/LTTE) which are not covered by official development cooperation.

Policy Dialogue and Conditionality (6)

Policy dialogue can be conducted at both bilateral and multilateral level. At bilateral level government negotiations and consultations and the embassies' on-going dialogue with govern-ment agencies provide regular opportunities for concerns to be expressed. Visits by leading political figures (to the partner country or to Germany) also enable topics relevant to conflicts to be raised. There are also opportunities for conducting a multilateral policy dialogue at the Consultative Group Meetings organized by the World Bank and at the level of the European Union, the United Nations and other international fora.

In some cases at least, bilateral relations have been seen as an opportunity for conducting a policy dialogue with a partner government on issues relevant to a conflict. In various cases, however, policy dialogue has been used to voice general criticism rather than impose any explicit conditionality (Sri Lanka and Rwanda being examples of this tendency). The policy dialogue entailing most conditionality was conducted with Kenya, the donor community bringing massive pressure to bear on its government. Germany played an important part at bilateral level and, as one of the leading donors, at international level in ensuring that a common international position was adopted.

Conclusions on the General Role of German Development Cooperation

As a general rule the direct influence which German development cooperation and the whole of the international donor community can have on conflict situations is very limited; this is particularly true of acute conflicts (open confrontation phase).

The experiences of other research projects are similar. Forman and Patrick (2000: 27) summarise the experience of different donors as follows:

"The findings of these six case studies suggest that even generous, well-intentioned foreign assistance provides no guarantee of sustainable recovery and lasting peace in countries emerging from civil violence."

On the basic of a DAC research effort in four countries Uvin (1999: 4) concludes:

"Aid alone usually has limited capacities to determine the dynamics of violent conflict: external aid (...) is often weak when weighed against the range of pressures and interests emanating from international, national, regional and local actors, both public and private."

On the whole, there has been a discernible tendency in German development cooperation for sensitivity to conflict situations to increase in the 1990s. Despite this positive tendency, development cooperation actors are often insufficiently aware of conflict situations. Con-ceptually, not enough attention is paid to this aspect; there are no real "conflict strategies" for the countries concerned. This is a major deficiency not only in countries particularly hard hit by conflicts (such as Rwanda) but also in countries where memories of conflict situations are fading (such as El Salvador).

Development cooperation can react to conflict situations in many different ways. However, the actors are often unaware of the options open to development cooperation for responding construc-tively to conflict situations, and greater use should be made of them; this is particularly true of countries in the phases before a conflict becomes violent. In countries where there is a recognizable potential for conflict it should be taken into account in an adequate form in the country concept and country discussion (possibly specific "conflict-re-lated country discussions"). In countries with clear conflict situations efforts to broach conflict-related problems during the policy dialogue should be stepped up. This is also true of the opportunities that German development cooperation has for bringing influence to bear on the multilateral policy dialogue.

Impact of German Development Cooperation on Potential and Actual Conflict Situations

It is methodologically difficult to analyse the impact of German development cooperation on potential and actual conflict situations. This is true both of the macro level – i.e. the influence of overall German development cooperation on a conflict – and of the level of individual projects and programmes (micro level).

Impacts at Macro Level

The six country studies come to different conclusions as to the overall impact of German development cooperation on potential and actual conflict situations. Three (Kenya, Mali and Sri Lanka) are, on the whole, rather positive. One (Rwanda) reaches a generally negative conclusion. Another (Ethiopia) is, by and large, ambivalent in its findings, and yet another (El Salvador) concludes that, seen as a whole, no direct impact can be detected. German development cooperation had most influence in Kenya and northern Mali.

All the studies identify opposing tendencies (ambivalence); in other words, in each case German development cooperation may exacerbate potential or actual conflict situations as well as make positive contributions.

The most important possible positive impacts at macro level are:

• the eventual removal of causes of conflict (regional disparities, employment opportunities, defusing of conflicts over natural resources, etc.),
• short- and medium-term political and social stabilization due to reconstruction measures,
  - political openness, participation, democratiza-tion and an increase in the conflict awareness of societies and political systems,
• achievement of security and improvement of human rights conditions through the presence of development cooperation personnel,
• removal of opportunities for self-enrichment and of clientele systems through economic reform programmes / structural adjustment.
  

The most important possible negative or problematical impacts at macro level are:

• direct support for and stabilization of governments (through official development cooperation) which are themselves involved in conflicts,
• exacerbation of conflicts through encouragement of clientele systems and opportunities for corruption,
• wrong signals sent to the government and opposition forces through "omission" (e.g. failure to seize opportunities during the policy dialogue) and "approval",
• increased regional imbalances through the promotion of certain regions preferred by the governing elites,
• violent countermeasures taken by the regime in response to pressure for political reform exerted by development cooperation (eventually, however, removal of potential for violence),
• easing of the pressure on governments to take action to deal with the causes of conflict through development cooperation ("internationalization" of government tasks),
• increase in the pressure to modernize (changes to economic structures and forms of social organization tend to cause conflicts),
• increase in competitive behaviour in the public sector due to economic reform programmes or structural adjustment.
  

Some of these impacts may be conducive to conflict in the short or medium term, while in the long term they may be appropriate and lead to an easing of tension (e.g. pressure for political reform, economic reform programmes).

Table 2: General Impact of Development Cooperation on Potential and Actual Conflict Situations in the Six Countries Evaluated

	Positive impacts	Negative impacts	Overall impact	Intensity of influence
Ethiopia	Impacts in certain areas that defuse conflict in the long term (removal of causes of conflict)	International development cooperation keeps regime in power No attempt to defuse conflict	Positive and negative impacts	Low to medium
El Salvador	Reaction to current needs	Support in principle for government as party to conflict Counterproductive consequences for German development cooperation because conflict situation neglected	No direct impacts demonstrable	Low
Kenya	Promotion of democratization process Building of public awareness	Violent reactions by regime following pressure for democratization Strengthening of local clientele systems	Predominantly positive results	High
Mali	Peaceful resolution of Tuareg conflict and handling of its political and economic consequences	Acceleration of the pressure to modernize	On the whole, very positive	High
Rwanda	Moderating influence on regime	Stabilization of regime	Contradictory impacts, with German develop-ment cooperation tend-ing to exacerbate con-flict	Low to medium
Sri Lanka	Removal of causes of conflict and strengthening of conflict resolution mechanisms	De facto strength-ening of government as party to conflict	Predominantly positive impacts	Low

Source: Klingebiel (1999: 21)

Impacts at Micro Level

Explicitly conflict-related measures

Experience with explicitly conflict-related measures of official German development cooperation and of non-governmental development cooperation reveals largely positive impacts on potential and actual conflict situations.

Various rehabilitation and stabilization packages in Sri Lanka and above all the "Northern Mali Programme" made particularly positive contributions. The measures essentially helped to normalize the situation in various regions; a decline in law-breaking and arbitrary acts is associated with the programmes. In Mali it was also possible to take direct action to reduce society's willingness to resort to conflict and violence and to help improve understanding between the warring parties.

Various measures to demobilize and reintegrate combatants in Ethiopia and El Salvador similarly proved successful. They also had adverse effects, however, since they were perceived as an instrument of ethnic colonization (also Ethiopia), and programmes assisted by other donors in Rwanda in this sphere were used to increase the efficiency of the military apparatus.

Most of the NGOs' conflict-related measures were rated very highly. The sometimes violent reactions of regimes (especially in Kenya and Ethiopia) to NGOs' conflict-related activities indicate that the latter were of some relevance and thus effective. Examples of positive impacts are:

• Direct action taken by the Churches to resolve conflicts in areas of unrest had the effect of promoting peace in Kenya. It helped to make political processes more transparent and to improve the quality of political debate at national and local level and contributed to the debate on reforms.
• In El Salvador the German Churches were able to provide considerable manpower as well as ideological and material support for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.
  

The measures taken – particularly by the Political Foundations – to promote democracy and human rights cannot be equated per se with the de-escalation of crises, since they may sometimes help to bring a conflict to a head in the short to medium term if the regime resorts to violent countermeasures. In the long term, however, they may prove very effective in removing potential for violence and causes of conflicts. 

The work of the Churches and that of the Political Foundations differ in one important respect: while the Churches usually have very good local interlocutors, the foundations depend on identifying suitable counterparts, an approach which may cause problems (e.g. El Salvador).

Non-conflict-related measures

Various development cooperation measures not geared to any specific conflict (such measures account for the bulk of German development cooperation activities in the cases studied) are found to have a wide variety of intended and, above all, unintended impacts.

The positive impacts are primarily contributions to the long-term reduction of causes of conflicts or to the removal of factors that exacerbate conflicts. Such contributions may, for example, take the form of projects and programmes concerning the protection of natural resources or the population policy sphere. Individual measures often have the further positive impact of contributing to the removal of clientelist structures, to the improvement of participation and to decentralization, although the real project objectives relate to "classical" areas of development policy (e.g. water supply).

On the other hand, four unintended negative impacts of development cooperation projects and programmes were identified in the countries studied. First, there was found to be a danger of some decentralization measures helping the government to develop monitoring structures and thus possibly repressive mechanisms. Second, development cooperation measures may encourage self-enriching and corrupt clientelist structures at national, regional and local level. Third, some development cooperation projects and programmes helped to increase disparities (e.g. among ethnic groups) by supporting, for example, infrastructure measures which were being implemented by the partner government and entailed the resettlement of certain ethnic groups. Fourth, there are indications of resource-related measures having unintended effects, where, for example, irrigation measures ease the pressure on land use, but also enable new settlers to move in, thus opening the way to fresh conflicts. Furthermore, the conditions may be such that other measures also have the effect of exacerbating conflicts. This was true, for instance, of a map financed as part of a GTZ project and showing a boundary line between Ethiopia and Eritrea that does not correspond to the internationally recognized border.

An Example from Sri Lanka

The Mahaweli programme in Sri Lanka provides an example for conflict exacerbation by development cooperation. Since the 1930s and especially the 1940s resettlement projects have been implemented by the national government in Sri Lanka to alleviate the growing shortage of land in the south-west, where the population is largely Sinhalese. Sri Lanka's Tamils have opposed these projects because they threaten to change the ethnic majority in the provinces concerned to the disadvantage of the Tamils and Muslims. With the Mahaweli project, which has been planned since the 1960s and consists of a large number of subsidiary energy generation projects, the country's largest scheme was launched, the aim being to use at least 74 % of the settled area – where Tamils previously formed the majority of the population – for Sinhalese. The Sinhalese settlement projects became one of the decisive motivating factors in the Tamils' resistance. This is not least evident from the many attacks on colonies of new Sinhalese settlers during the civil war. As the Tamils and the LTTE see it, the settlement policy is one of the main causes of the civil war. 

The international donor community has supported the Mahaweli project since 1977. The Federal Republic of Germany contributed large loans to the financing of two dams forming part of the overall project (Randenigala: DM 400 m; Rantembe: DM 230 m); one loan agreement was signed before, the other after the outbreak of the civil war. For a long time Germany did not see the ethnically oriented settlement policy underlying the Mahaweli project as a particular problem. As late as September 1983 the Federal Government stated in its written answer to a question raised in the Bundestag that the project had no discernible implications for the conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese. The settlement policy was financed and implemented by the Sri Lankan government entirely on its own responsibility. 

In the early 1990s some donors (especially Norway, Canada and the World Bank) began looking critically at their own development cooperation policies in the context of the Mahaweli project.

Impact of Individual Instruments

On the basis of the country studies a number of general statements can be made on various development cooperation instruments. The potential impact of policy dialogue and conditionality on conflict situations is particularly pronounced. Success largely depends on the leading donors' adoption of a coordinated approach, the avoidance of excessive development cooperation ("over-aiding") and verifiable specific demands and conditions. Both financial cooperation and technical cooperation have a number of specific features that may be relevant to conflicts. As partner governments are usually particularly interested in financial cooperation, therefore linking it to policy dialogue or conditions can, in principle, be very effective. Technical cooperation, on the other hand, is more controllable, which normally makes it possible to exercise greater influence on individual project and programme components. It also has a stronger external organizational structure (country offices). Furthermore, the fungibility of development cooperation may pose a problem for both financial and technical cooperation. In some cases non-governmental organizations also offer conflict-related measures, which are particularly important and out of the question for official development cooperation. Success does, however, very much depend on there being a suitable counterpart structure, which not all NGOs have.

Conclusions on the Impact of German Development Cooperation

Development cooperation in conflict situations has special features and requires a specific approach. The special features relate very largely to unstable and changing conditions and requirements in the countries concerned.(7)

In the past little account was taken of the impacts of German development cooperation with regard to conflicts. This is especially true of unintended negative impacts at both macro and project level. There were no criteria to enable relevance to conflicts to be identified quickly. An analysis of the impacts of German development cooperation on potential and actual conflict situations produces a heterogeneous picture. A wide range of positive and negative effects can be identified at macro and project level. The links are complex. The impacts of German development cooperation or even individual measures are often inconsistent.

More deliberate use should be made of German development cooperation for strategic purposes in conflict situations, so that better account may be taken and a better assessment made of the general positive and negative impacts it has (assessment of political consequences). Development cooperation measures should always take account not only of technical aspects but also of factors of relevance to conflicts, since no project is in fact purely technical.(8)  The instruments of German development cooperation should be used more purposefully against the background of a country's conflict situation. Where the government is involved in the conflict and pursues a repressive policy that exacerbates it, serious thought should be given to terminating development cooperation or changing the instruments used.

At the level of individual measures efforts should be made to analyse systematically positive and negative impacts relevant to conflicts (conflict im-pact assessment) and to take account of the findings at every stage of the planning, implementation and monitoring/evaluation. Since there is an ongoing debate on how to develop and how to implement a conflict impact assessment method, experiences are already available.(9)

It is also necessary to consider whether under the prevailing conditions other policies support or possibly run counter to any conflict-related efforts forming part of German development cooperation. As a general rule foreign policy plays a coordinating role in this context.

It should also be emphasized that the way in which German development cooperation is perceived in the country affected by conflict is very important. In general, official development cooperation tends to give one warring party – the government – direct and indirect support.

References 

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Patrick, Stewart (2000): The Donor Community and the Challenge of Postconflict Recovery, in: Forman, Shepard / Patrick, Stewart, eds. (2000): Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery, pp. 35-65, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
Uvin, Peter (1999): The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict, A Synthesis and a Commentary on the Lessons Learned from Case Studies on the Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations, Paris: OECD
World Bank (1998): The World Bank Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
 

 
Notes 

1) The evaluation was guided by a scheme comprising a total of five roughly defined phases of conflict: (1) emergence, (2) escalation, (3) eruption, (4) de-escalation and (5) consolidation. The first two phases are often referred to as "pre-conflict", the last two as "post-conflict" phases.

2) Rwanda differs significantly from the other "civil war countries" in various respects, there being little comparison between its genocide and the hostilities elsewhere.

3) GTZ is responsible for technical assistance and KfW is responsible for financial assistance. GTZ and KfW are the most important implementing agencies for German development cooperation.

4) For excellent clarifications of conflict-related terms see Kurtz ed. (1999), for detailed definitions related to development cooperation see OECD (1999).

5) For an overview on this broad and complex topic see, for example, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), Cortright (ed., 1997), and Kurtz (ed. 1999).

6) For further experiences in the area of policy dialogue and conditionality see, for example, Ball (1996), Patrick (2000), Eide/Ronnfeldt (1998), and several contributions in Cortright ed. (1997).

7) Anderson (1999) and Ball (1996) are dealing in more detail with this issue.

8) Concerning other case studies Uvin (1999: 4) summarises: "All aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives, for peace or for war, regardless of whether these effects are deliberate, recognised or not, before, during or after war."

9) For example, Leonhardt (1999) provides an excellent overview on the state of the art. A concrete approach was presented by Bush (1998). Klingebiel et al. (2000) gained first experiences in applying such a method.

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