Abdoulaye Fall
Force Commander
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Côte d'Ivoire

Allow me, first of all, to express my gratitude to the German authorities and the leaders of Capacity Building International, who kindly invited me to be involved in this dialogue.
It is a special pleasure to me, as the former Force Commander of the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), and now in my capacity as the current Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in the same country (UNOCI) to be given the opportunity to make a personal input to the dialogue on the general topic that the Forum singled out for this session.

Cote d'Ivoire constitutes, certainly, a relevant case study on cooperation in security and crisis prevention and management issues. The positive benefits of the partnerships developed during the mission should be strengthened, and some of the initiatives taken during the operation should be established in a formal manner, with the objective to enhance the support provided to the military component to meet up with its commitment.

1 From the first achievements to the first challenges

1.1 The first achievements
A diplomatic success of ECOWAS was achieved with the signing on 17 October 2002 of the first cease-fire agreement. The French troops offered to stand on a separation line between the warring parties.
Since that suspension of the military fights, the countless initiatives that ECOWAS has carried out, have greatly contributed to the progress of the peace process.
The multinational force mandated along the French forces, since its first operational duty on March 29, 2003 to its merger into the United Nations' operation on April 4, 2004, recorded significant achievements including:

• A shift from the monitoring of the cease fire line, to the control of the zone of confidence, casting further away the spectre of direct confrontations;
• The restoration of the broken dialogue between the belligerents parties, with as results:
  - War prisoners released,
  - A joint D.D.R implementation plan developed,
  - And the use of heavy weaponry stopped.

In addition to the fact that:

• Trade and humanitarian corridors were opened;
• The impartial forces' operations were expanded throughout the territory in the aim of restoring confidence and assisting the regrouping of combatants;
• An important civil-military activities programme including a priority fold in free medical assistance to the populations;
• And securing the close protection of the members of the government.
  Such outstanding field outputs are the ample justifications of the decision made, at a very early stage of the crisis, to couple the military instrument and the political and diplomatic efforts which were deployed on a regular basis.
  Nevertheless, despite such achievements, it should be brought to notice that, how relevant the option of the leadership of ECOWAS was, there are still some major hindrances which recurrently undermine every opportunity of the military component to reach the objectives that are pursued, to an optimum level.

1.2 The first challenges
To mobilize adequate resources and sustain a high level of operational readiness within the troops who are deployed, so as to enable them to fulfil their mandate with the greatest efficiency, this is the greatest challenge of ECOWAS.
In current peace operations, where one of the chief concerns is to secure the protection and safety of the populations, the point is no longer to act as a passive interposition force, but to be proactive and resort, if need be, to force, in order to deny any action that can jeopardize the lives of human beings, or prevent the peace units from carrying out their missions.
All told, the ultimate goal is to be able to meet the requirements for an available force, endowed with sound pressure and deterrence capacities.
Unfortunately, exhaustion and even lack of relevant capabilities distinguish most of African national armies. To such an extent that, a subregional force is usually characterized by the following inherent weaknesses:

• Slow responsiveness in troop mobilization,
• Inadequate country owned equipment,
• Poor logistic support facilities,
• Modest funding resources.

Conscious of that, African leaders made a turn to search for a cooperation policy that led to the development of some partnerships. The case of Cote d'Ivoire shows the opportunities that such a cooperation can bring about, and the possibility to open at the same time some paths of solidarity to strengthen African capabilities.

2 Cote d'Ivoire: an example of successful partnership at the service of peace

21 Capacity strengthening in ECOWAS units
2.1.1 Logistic support
At the level of the peace force, Great Britain channelled its efforts through Ghana; Belgium, supported Benin in adding up its efforts to those of France, which conveyed its assistance via Niger, Senegal And Togo. These five were the troops contributing countries in ECOMICI.
The United States made a contribution in strategic transportation (For the induction and repatriation of the contingents), in facilitation of the movement of personnel within the mission area (vehicles, communications equipment) and in funding the 2/3 of the food requirements.

Those various lines of partnerships which were implemented simultaneously to guarantee that ECOWAS troops could receive a sound logistical Support, were buttressed with a substantial financial effort that came from some donor countries which, along France which was the main financial donor, could help satisfy the financial requirements of the force.

2.1.2 Financial contributions
The monthly budget of the force accounted for 1.3 million euros for 1,300 men. The financial cost for the 12 month of ECOMICI operations (about 15 million euros ) could be obtained owing to a set of assistance agreements, that provided for some inputs from France (lead donor), which were topped up with contributions made by the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain.
The above conventions, and the contribution pledged by the donor countries were to some degree, a source of satisfaction. However, for future ECOWAS peace operations, a more sustainable financial solution is to be found.

2.2 ECOWAS/European Union cooperation
The European Union (EU) put in place some financial facilities so as to contribute to the fulfilment of the objectives of ECOWAS whose achievements can be viewed as landmarks.
The tentative financial replenishment programme of the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) for 2003-2007 for the West African region, with a portfolio of 235 million euros, made the projection that 10 million euros would be allocated to the peace endeavours of ECOWAS as a whole.
Equally, some ad-hoc operations were carried out through the tentative national programme of Cote d'Ivoire, to fund ECOMIC's action in Cote d'Ivoire.
Within the field of scope of assistance to the negotiations on the economic partnership agreement, between West Africa and the EU, which provides a financial pipeline of 10 million euros; several projects intended to strengthen the capacities of the special organs of ECOWAS will be undertaken.
Due to the lengthy procedure to obtain the disbursement of the EDF Funds a quick response mechanism has been established to allow the European Union to respond quickly, efficiently, and in flexible manner to crisis situations. In the case of the Ivorian crisis, funds were mobilized through this mechanism in order to uphold the mediation efforts of ECOWAS in late 2002, and to back up the international monitoring committee established by Linas-Marcoussis Agreements.
Within the framework of the political dialogue, between EU and ECOWAS, important recommendations were adopted for peace and security in the sub-region. A certain number of guidelines on the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire, and on the cooperation with the United Nations were also given.

2.3 UNITED NATIONS/ECOWAS cooperation
In Cote d'Ivoire, the ongoing joint cooperative activities of ECOWAS and the United Nations (UN) fall into the range of various areas of interest:

2.3.1 Diplomatic support
The legitimate international status of the operation of ECOWAS in Cote d'Ivoire was enshrined by the support of the United Nations, who vested upon the Security Council, through Resolution 1464, the global plan of crisis settlement, as suggested in Linas Marcoussis Agreements. Resolution 1528 which is an extension of such legitimacy recommends that UNOCI should uphold the government of reconciliation in harmony with ECOWAS and other international partners.

2.3.2 Operational backstopping
As regards the assistance which is provided for the troops in the field, the formula of the so called "The Third Party", support was adopted for the five ECOWAS troop contributing countries. Memorandums of understanding were signed between each country and a strategic partner, among Belgium, Great Britain and France.
These countries supported the efforts of the African ones to meet the UN requirements, by making provision for the allocation and the maintenance of some parts of the equipment that were needed by the various national contingents, essentially, in the keys areas of mobility, communications and individual equipment.

2.3.3 Joint development
The experience that has been gained in joint deployment is also a hallmark in the cooperation of ECOWAS and the UN, translated by the engagement of the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) which was initiated in compliance with Resolution 1479 along the ECOWAS Mission In Cote D'Ivoire (ECOMICI).
Resolution 1528 is the unfailing evidence of the will of the UN to carry on with such an indispensable cooperation. so, on the military level, there are in the current operation, five contingents, issued from the past ECOMICI, which make up the nucleus of UNOCI, and to which some additional units came to be grafted progressively from, Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan And France. The French forces of the Licorne operation, act as a quick reaction force.

However, beyond the success of the United Nations operation in Cote d'Ivoire, in which ECOWAS would be a major stakeholder, it clearly appears that, some initiatives must be taken or strengthened, with a view to make those various partnerships much more beneficial.

3 For a greater stability in our forces' performance: avenues of thought

3.1 Control Of The Operational Availability Of ECOWAS Stand-By Units
The process of force generation, would make a greater performance, if ECOWAS could activate a control mechanism and check the operational availability of such units.

3.2 Creation of a strategic planning cell
Setting up a political-military entity in the executive secretariat would be an undeniable positive contribution for the improvement of the strategic planning and solution of the management of the military and political problems that a peace keeping operation is unavoidably confronted with.

3.3 Activation of a standing force staff
Boosting the operational efficiency of the force would require, without any doubt, that a standing force staff be put in place, and equipped with modern means that would enable it to plan and be up to implement every operation.

3.4 Settting up a subregional logistic base
The recurrent challenge of supply the forces with equipment could find a better solution from the improvement in the coordination of the RECAMP and other assistance programmes, but also in the setting up of an ECOWAS logistic base, where the most important equipment and material, made available by different partners, could be stored and maintained for quick deployment.

3.5 Educational, training acquisition and benefits in the harmonization of standard operating procedures to be retained
The action that is undertaken at the level of national military academies and peace keeping training centres should be reinforced as well as all the efforts that will be made in order to harmonize the standard operating procedures, should be further consolidated. Tactical studies and training in Zambakro/Cote d'Ivoire (now in Koulikoro/Mali) operative ones in Accra/Ghana and strategic ones in Abuja/Nigeria.

Such commendable initiatives should also be completed with the provision of some specialized trainings, mainly in intelligence and civil-military activities, in the prospect of developing in the long run some Qualified Resource persons who will be proficient enough to be involved in liaison and contact cells and in civil-military coordination cells, meant to prepare and facilitate a deployment in hostile environment.

3.6 Establishment of a lasting financial system
ECOWAS should also develop some planning capacity, and identify all the priority needs to manage and gear in a consistent manner efforts of the donors that still have to be coordinated. The ultimate goal should be to build a special peace keeping fund, whose objective would be to sustain the forces deployed to fulfil mission as mandated by ECOWAS.
A battle group of the type that ECOWAS dispatches, which has a population of 1500 men could operate on a financial portfolio of 15 million euros every semester.
The special fund of the European, termed peace keeping facility, which is taking the buck over the ad-hoc finances which were provided so far from the national indicative programmes, could be tapped in the sub region to cover the annual operating budget of at least two conventional battle groups, an amount of 60 million euros.

May then the outputs of this policy dialogue contribute to improve further the cooperation facilities that exist already between ECOWAS, the Organization of the United Nations and the European Union; with the prospect of achieving, one of those community objectives of establishing a standing, efficient regional force, capable to be displayed at reasonable notice and within reasonable deadlines, and to be supported in an acceptable fashion throughout its deployment.

Top of page

Contents	Speeches/Issues Notes	EF Homepage
Preface	Programme	EF Texts and Reports
Summary of Discussions	List of Participants