Colonel Duncan Francis
Former Commander
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J7
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), United Kingdom

General Background Points:

• UK believes that the PRT concept is generally perceived by the international community to have been a success, in particular in North Afghanistan, and it is likely that they will be increasingly used in Peace Support Operations in the future, most probably in a multi-national context.
• Political-military environment requires political-military solutions, and therefore early and enduring cooperation between the key government departments (most importantly Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development) at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is key to success.
• PRTs must be set within the context of an integrated political-military plan (and unified command) in support of the critical objectives of the providing nation(s), supported government and the international community.
• PRTs must operate in parallel with, and not in competition with, the international assistance community. They should set the secure conditions in order to allow the NGOs to be able to operate.

PRTs:

• There is still a general lack of understanding of what PRTs are and what they do, exacerbated by the fact that there are several different models.
• These differ according to national doctrine and to the specific political-military environment in which they are operating:
  - US views the PRT as being a development tool which carries out assistance and development projects in areas where the NGOs cannot go.
  - UK sees the PRT in a Peace Support (PSO) role, providing Security Sector Reform (SSR) in order to allow IOs and NGOs to carry out development in a secure environment. However, it accepts that the role and make-up of a PRT will be situationally-dependant (i.e. Kandahar is different to Mazar).
  - NZ (Bamian) leans towards the UK view, but still carries out some assistance projects.
  - Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Romania are contributors to the UK PRT and have a similar approach.
  - UK PRT is a political-military organization (including Afghans) which interfaces with military, faction, political, governmental and religious leaders across its AO.
  - UK therefore sees a necessity for the PRT to be integrated into the community, which in turn requires a light approach and force profile.
  - UK sees a need to have small teams deployed widely across the area of operations, providing a local focus.
  - The UK will accept a certain level of risk in order to achieve the mission. ('If you cannot do the job, then do not deploy')
  - UK PRTs only carry out development of police infrastructure/equipment, government ministries and infrastructure (roads and bridges).
  - UK PRTS clear all development projects through NGOs in advance via UNAMA.

Long-term prospects for Afghanistan:

• Afghans have the will and energy to help themselves, and a general thirst for peace.
• Afghans are a proud people who want to govern themselves. A light presence is preferable to a heavy footprint; you cannot force Afghans to do what they do not want to. Instead, you must influence their outlook and views.
• There is a real drive for politics above fighting; for example General Dostum running for president, General Atta becoming Governor of Balkh, the creation of new political parties, political rallies and the success of voter registration. Whether this will last after the elections remains to be seen.
• There is a major amount of investment by Afghans in bricks and mortar in Afghanistan, indicating a faith in the future. As the standard of living rises, people will become less willing to be involved in conflict.
• There is still deep-seated mistrust between the various political/ethnic groups in the provinces, and local power is still held very much by the factional leaders. However, the number of visible weapons carried in the North is constantly decreasing.
• Key to continued Afghan stability will be the development of a properly-trained, well-equipped, relatively uncorrupt, relatively unpartisan Afghan National Police Force, responsible for internal security.
• The Afghan National Army should develop as a protection force against external aggression.
• A measured disbandment of the militias is necessary to avoid upsetting the political-military balance. The hand-over of heavy weapons is becoming increasingly irrelevant, since they are not the weapons that are likely to be used in the future, although they do remain a potent political signal.
• Counter-narcotics will become an increasingly important part of SSR, in order to stop Afghanistan from becoming a narco-state.
• The ATA needs to regain control of the borders, in order to receive the revenue from customs duties.
• Does NATO have the capability to extend its mandate into Phase 2 and 3 of ISAF expansion?
• A lack of cooperation between NGOs leads to fragmented assistance and frustration within both the IO and Afghan communities.
• There is a view in the provinces that development is to Kabul-centric, with the vast majority of IO and NGO personnel being Kabul-based, and with little idea of what is happening in the provinces.
• There is a lack of information downwards from Kabul about the long-term aims and planning of assistance projects.
• There is also a view (supported by the facts) that the majority of assistance money is being spent in the Pashtun South, as opposed to the rest of the country.
• The lead on development should be ATA (Afghanistan for the Afghans), helped by good governance guiding by the international community.
• There will continue to be friction between the uneducated leaders who remained in Afghanistan, and the returned educated diaspora, who are necessary for development but who are rejected by many as having run away when the going got tough.

And finally:

• There needs to be recognition that this is a long-term plan. Afghanistan will not turn overnight into a free and booming Western democracy.
  

Top of page

Contents	Speeches/Issues Notes	EF Homepage
Preface	Programme	EF Texts and Reports
Summary of Discussions	List of Participants