Texts and Reports
- Development Policy and the Armed Forces - Speeches and Issues Notes
Issues
Note
Ibrahim
Gambari
Under-Secretary-General
Special Adviser on Africa at the United Nations Secretariat
Office of Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA)
United Nations (UN), New York
I would like to
use my time to address the first three questions posed by the organizers
for this session. And those are first how to ensure a coherent approach
for international peace planning (IPP), from military peacekeeping through
to sustainable development. We start with peacekeeping and go through
to sustainable development, how do we do it in a coherent manner.
The second is what
examples do we have of successful transitions from peacekeeping or peace
enforcement to sustainable development and reconstruction strategies.
And the third question
that I would like to address is how can complementary cooperation in
the UN be improved, that is between DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping
Operations), UNDP and so on and so forth, and how can Germany contribute
in this complementary cooperation at the UN, and this improvement.
The first point
that I would like to make is that we need to improve upon the current
instrument which we have, we have an instrument, and that instrument
is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, otherwise known as
DDR. We need to improve on that instrument for peace consolidation activities
and then to build into it - right from the design stage - the sustainable
development component. So let me assess where we are with respect to
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as an instrument to see
then how we can improve on it.
The premise of
DDR remains valid in my opinion, which is that large armies and paramilitary
definitely undermine sustainable development. In the same way it is
very clear to me at least that unintegrated, demobilized soldiers including
child soldiers constitute threats to long time stability in post-conflict
countries and definitely discourage investments which are badly needed
for economic development and job creation in Africa. Unfortunately,
however, the current practice in DDR does not necessary lead to stability
or to development in Africa. And so we need to improve on current processes
by doing the following: First, I would like to suggest that we want
to assure that reintegration takes place within the context of a larger
development strategy. It is not a question of choosing between security
and development. And it is not a question of security even before development.
But the joint imperative of on the one hand silencing the guns and on
the other hand pursuing strategies for economic growth, job creation
and poverty reduction. I would like to return to this a little bit later
in my presentation.
Secondly, we also
need to factor in the fact that the conditions in which we tackle DDR,
that is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, that takes place
- they are not the same everywhere. We have to reject the one size fits
all approaches. The complexities of each conflict must be recognized
and addressed, just as we must recognize the differences between the
root causes of different conflicts. For example, in Angola the government
did not see the need for a large military presence to implement DDR
programmes. Whereas in Sierra Leone and later on in Liberia we had to
have huge military forces to implement the programme of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration, that is why Sierra Leone had the largest
single UN peacekeeping force in the world, between 14,000 to 15,000
soldiers. And just as we were drawing down those forces in Sierra Leone
we had to send them or build a similar capacity in Liberia.
Furthermore, Angola
has, again by way of comparison and to make my point that one size does
not fit all, Angola has relatively speaking a better resource-base and
administrative capacity compared to, say, Liberia and Somalia. And that's
why for example, the Angolans are having difficulties getting international
commitment for what you call an international donors conference, to
have them give resources for peace consolidation, because the attitude
is that they don't need the money, they are already rich enough. I understand
for example that Angola will be producing as much oil as Nigeria currently
does in a few years. And they are one tenth of the population of Nigeria,
about 12 million. Also that unless Angola deals with the issues of corruption
and lack of transparency they are not likely to get the resources for
securing the peace in that country. In addition, and as my office in
New York suggested at the Round Table during the last ECOSOC High Level
Segment Meeting in New York in June, there are a couple of issues to
be put on the table, one is that if you want really to build this gap,
or this transition, or to make the transition work, from end of war
to laying a foundation of sustainable peace, then we have to promote
the necessary factors to encourage the peace and quality of DDR. Because
the political and security situation in post-conflict countries are
usually very tenuous. That's why the ceasefire, tensions and distress
between the parties remain high and any small incident could derail
a fragile peace, especially given the easy availability of arms, small
arms and light weapons among the population. During this initial state
the peace of disarmament and demobilization is also often seen by the
parties as proof for good faith and the basis to build confidence for
the implementation of other aspects of the peace agreement. While the
quality of the process on the other hand is seen as a demonstration
of commitment to leave behind the military option and to create conditions
which will ensure future stability. Therefore, in my view, in our view,
an effective DDR programme that can contribute to the consolidation
of peace requires a convergence of factors which can promote the pace
and quality of disarmament and demobilization during the initial stages
of peace. These factors include realistic peace agreements, appropriate
implementation mechanisms, sanctions, regime targeted sanctions, the
presence of international guarantors, political and economic incentives
and an effective national and international leadership.
Unfortunately,
not in every instance has this situation benefited from such a conducive
convergence of factors. I am suggesting that the international community
should better address the challenge of ensuring the necessary convergence
of the factors to make it a reality for each context.
The second, and
I think that possibly the most important, is the need for effective
international assistance, because unfortunately when the international
community often assisted in getting funds for DDR, the impact of this
assistance has not always been very positive. Because often the financial
assistance for reintegration is not quickly disbursed, the donors are
bound by rigorous rules in the use of development money which is based
of course on their foreign policy priorities rather than the needs of
the giving countries. Finally it also tends to run out just when it
is needed for reintegration and laying the foundation for economic recovery
and development.
So, how do we move
from promoting culture of dependency, which is likely to compromise
sustainable development, and really try to get these countries quickly
on their feet so that they can begin to earn their ways. I would also
believe in this regard that bilateral donors need to consider allocating
funds especially for transition periods, as bridging moneys to help
meet complex demands of managing successful transition. And then we
have to address the issue of different sources of funds, for peacekeeping
on the one hand, which is a fair contribution, it is regular, it is
known, is allocated in advance, is predictable on the one hand and those
for development which is a voluntary contribution which is not known
and which is not predictable.
And finally I would
like to suggest that there is a need to approach DDR as a part of a
larger strategy for national recovery. In my view in this regard I believe
we have to have strategies in place to promote economic recovery, economic
growth and development, at the same time as we authorize the peacekeeping
operations. There has to be in this regard mechanisms in place to promote
better management of the natural and mineral resources where they exist
and to the extent that they exist in post-conflict countries. And this
is where I believe the priority of the peacekeepers to help in extending
the authorities of the central government throughout the country must
be pursued in tandem with the priorities of the development actors in
terms of promoting the extension of administrative structures to those
areas. So it is not enough to just make sure that deployed peacekeepers,
in such a way that the government can reach everywhere but where are
the administrative structures, where are the law courts, where are the
civil servants to help in the provision of social services, the schools,
the health services. And we have to do so while also addressing the
issue of accountability, the issue of transparency, and also checking
the issue of corruption.
The second question,
what is a successful, what have been examples of successful transition
from peacekeeping to reconstruction and development strategies in Africa?
It is very clear to me, the prime candidate for this is Mozambique.
And I think there are four reasons, four or five reasons why this is
so and we need to look at them carefully to see how we can try to create
similar conditions in order to perhaps give us a prospect of success.
I will say the first is the quality of leadership on the part of the
president, Chissano, and of the United Nations Mission in Mozambique.
The head of that mission is a gentleman familiar to most of you, Aldo
Ayelo, who is currently, I believe, the UN special representative for
the Great Lakes. I have met him many times, and I have met him on ground
in Mozambique, he was the hands on, he knew how to knock the heads of
agencies together to move in the direction that he wanted. And president
Chissano was also a leader that was accommodating and recognized the
importance of bending for national reconciliation. So leadership on
the part of the country and on the parts of the UN mission in that country
is very critical.
Second, I will
say adequate resources. Ayelo, Aldo Ayelo, I don't know how he did it,
but he always manages to get the resources that he needed for not only
DDR by laying the foundation for economic growth and development. I
think people. other SRSGs ought to learn from him.
Third, there has
to be a lead country in this process. A lead country, some country that
has volunteered to be the lead.
Fourth, the full
participation of development agencies, civil societies and the NGOs.
Because as you know, development is far too important to leave in the
hands of governments and the warlord factions alone.
And finally, good
coordination between all the agencies.
Mr. Chairman, I
would just like to end by saying that we also need to use, to make better
use of the modalities provided by intergovernmental bodies for promoting
coordinated international response to the challenging transition from
war to development. For example, we have the ECOSOC ad-hoc working group
of countries emerging from conflict. They have decided to zero in on
Guinea Bissau and Burundi. I think this can be extended. The group liaisons
with the Security Council so that the gap between security and development
can be bridged through the activities of both principle organs of the
UN. One way forward, in my view, and this is not a view of the Secretary
General, otherwise he may disown it before I can even get to New York.
Why would we want to continue to refer to it as an ad-hoc group? I mean
if the purpose of it is real and the need is real why is it an ad-hoc
arrangement between ECOSOC and the Security Council? It should be a
permanent mechanism to coordinate and bridge the concerns between the
security concerns in New York headquarters and the development concerns.
Finally I would
see the rule of the Bretton Woods institutions needs to be more closely
coordinated with the efforts of the departments and the programmes dealing
with peace and security on the one hand and the development agenda of
the UN on the other hand. The IMF and World Bank need to provide expanded
assistance to cover the needs of countries in post-conflict situations.
While it is true that the World Bank through its transition support
strategies (TSS) helps such countries by closely aligning priorities
with the objectives and sequencing priorities in peace accords and recovery
development plans, I think they need to do more. Giving you an example,
for example in Guinea Bissau, and this is my last word, we cannot have
the objective of moving them from war to peace in sustainable development,
at the same time the World Bank is taking money that is supposed to
be owed them by Guinea Bissau, the little money they earn from fisheries,
the World Bank is taking it away at the same time as we are supposed
to be laying the foundation for recovery and economic development in
a country that is very poor. There has to be some synergy. We cannot
as I said, give with one hand and take with the other hand. And I believe
the rule of the German government is to support the efforts that is
being made both at the UN headquarters and particularly in the Bretton
Woods institutions, because they have critical roles to play in laying
the foundation for economic growth and development as the guns are silenced
through the activities of the UN peacekeeping operations.
|
Contents