Texts and Reports - Development Policy and the Armed Forces - Speeches and Issues Notes


Issues Note

Ron Keller
Director-General
DG International Co-operation (DGIS)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands

 

It is an honour for me to address you during this conference on development policy and the armed forces. In my view, the organizers could not have picked a more suitable city for discussing this theme. We all know how much this city has suffered from political and military tensions. And look at it today: it is a vibrant city flourishing in a stable and secure environment. Not only does this city therefore represent the link between security and development, but its development also illustrates the need for close co-operation between all branches of government in order to stimulate economic and social progress. Nowhere in Europe has the destruction by military power been so complete and the combined civil-military effort to rebuild a city been so strong. Some areas, like the restructuring of the army, police and border control structures needed military expertise. Other areas needed civilian expertise. The resurrection of Berlin was due to such a joint, integrated approach.

However, we are not here to dwell on the beauties of the city of Berlin, but to discuss the challenges in those areas of the world that are both poverty stricken and recovering from conflicts. I mention in this respect countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan, the DRC and Burundi. All of these countries are in dire need of peace and stability for badly needed sustainable reconstruction to take shape. To this end, joint planning and implementation of security-related and other activities are of vital importance in order to address all aspects of the reconstruction agenda thoroughly.

Not so long ago, relations between development workers and soldiers were characterized by suspicion, yes even hostility. Fortunately, interaction between the two has become increasingly pragmatic and realistic. One could say that their relationship is maturing. Mature professional relationships are based upon mutual respect, rationality of tasks, and complementarity. This implies an approach, whereby each partner does what it can do best.

In the Netherlands, the awareness of the need to achieve this mature balance between rationalization of tasks and complementarity of efforts has grown slowly but surely in the last few years. No doubt, the simultaneous involvement of the Dutch development community and the military in places like Afghanistan and Macedonia stimulated this search for an integrated approach. Rational integration rather than forced segregation between military and development activities will help us in becoming more effective in our efforts for sustainable reconstruction of Sudan and Burundi.

Complementarity

To tackle complex post-conflict situations the Netherlands is of the opinion that long-term, integrated multidisciplinary engagement is needed. Both the armed forces and civil branches of government should jointly be planning and implementing activities aimed at creating peace and stability. A case in point is Security Sector Reform: issues relating to governance, accountability and transparency and the challenge of furthering democratic control of the armed forces can benefit from decades of lessons learned in development cooperation work. At the same time, it will be difficult, if not impossible to achieve meaningful reform, without actual 'hands-on' involvement of military personnel in co-operation with military from the recipient country. Our military often speak a similar language and can, for example, indicate how effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector can go hand in hand with governance and accountability. The complementarity is evident.

The need to combine military and civil expertise in Security Sector Reform has led the Netherlands Government to investigate how these forms of expertise can be pooled in an inter-ministerial operational structure. Although the exercise is still in its fact-finding phase, early indications are that we can learn a lot from our friends in the United Kingdom. In the UK, pool funding, joint planning and joint implementation by multi-departmental Defence Advisory Teams seem to have led to good operational results in Sierra Leone.

Complementarity does not only play a role at national level; it is also relevant at the international level. The Netherlands will never try to implement Security Sector Reform on its own. The subject matter is too sensitive politically and too complex technically: international co-ordination is essential. Many international organizations, like the UN, EU and NATO have significant SSR capacities or are in the process of creating these. Where possible, for the sake of legitimacy, these organizations should even take the lead in the reform exercise, with member states playing a following role. However, the usefulness of most organizations is hampered by geographical limitations (NATO) or by a too limited mandate for army reform (UN). Therefore, sometimes, a strong bilateral or plurilateral engagement (at the request of the host government) cannot be ruled out. Naturally, should this occur, a UN mandate or endorsement of this engagement will be very important as this organization is the only body that can bestow legitimacy on these kind of operations.


Rationalization

As I just stated, ideally, we should establish a close working relationship between the development community and the military, based on the principle of national and international complementarity. This means that for purposes of poverty reduction and development in conflict-related situations, we shall often have to rely on active engagement by the military. However, the priorities of the military may not always be similar to those of the development community. For example, African conflicts may not carry the same weight for our ministries of defence as conflicts that are directly related to the war on terrorism. How can we influence the setting of priorities- in such a way that post-conflict reconstruction in developing countries becomes a priority for these ministries?

One way of doing this is by developing an integrated policy framework, and by building inter-ministerial pools and other structures. These would enhance the insight that effective management of complex conflict situations requires that the development and security sectors cooperate in an integrated way. Priority setting then logically has to be done at a higher political level integrating the two sectors, for instance in Cabinets of Ministers. Effective conflict policies will require increased funding, both from development funds and from security budgets, in other words both ODA and non-ODA funds.

It is in this context that the Netherlands seeks to address inconsistencies in international ODA norms that stand in the way of a truly integrated approach to achieve sustainable development in post-conflict countries. Why, for example, do these rules allow activities aimed at the reform of the police to be considered ODA, while the same is not applicable to the army? We all know the importance of a stable and well governed security sector for peace and stability in any country. And surely if we want both the police and the army to be able to execute their respective mandates and roles - the provision of internal versus external security under transparent and democratic control - should we not work with both institutions to achieve this? If the army is part of the problem, should it then not be part of the solution too?

Mutual respect

Neither complementarity, nor rationalization can be achieved without a third element, being mutual respect. Only if the relationship between the development community and the military at national level is based on mutual respect, can an integrated approach materialize. Only if discussions amongst donors are based on mutual respect, can we achieve progress in rationalization and complementarity. The recent discussions in Paris on ODA-eligibility showed the willingness to have constructive debates in this field, based on such respect. I want to ensure you that the Netherlands listens very carefully to the viewpoints of other donors. We fully respect differing opinions and understand that each partner has its own arguments for or against our concept of rationalization. We cannot and do not wish to impose our viewpoints on our friends.

Ladies and Gentlemen. In my expose I have tried to shed some light on current thinking within my Government on rationalization of tasks between development and defence actors. Also I elaborated upon the concept of complementarity, and the need for close cooperation between departments and between international partners in the area of Security Sector Reform.
We are convinced that we are on the right track in improving our approach to aid in the establishment of peace and stability in post-conflict countries. However, the topic of joint planning and an integrated approach is still relatively new. We have a lot to learn from you, our international partners. Your insights will lead us to better approaches to post-conflict situations. Hopefully, we can plan and implement these approaches jointly with you. We need it, but the "Berlins" of this world deserve it.

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